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THE CAPACITY OF A MENTALLY RETARDED
PERSON TO CONSENT:







Mental retardation is an imprecise term used to describe the condition
of a large group of people who do not possess the cognitive ability to meet
the demands of society.' There are many causes of retardation including
birth defects, head trauma, disease, and environmental factors.2 The
condition is not necessarily static, and in some cases it may be improved by
training and support. Many retarded individuals can lead increasingly
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1. See Robert L. Hayman, Jr., Presumptions of Justice: Law, Politics, and the Mentally
Retarded Parent, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1201, 1213, 1248 n.249 (1990). Note that for the
purposes of this chapter, the terms "disabled" or "handicapped" are also used to described a
person with diminished mental capacity.
2. See id. at 1213.
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"normal" lives.3 American jurisprudence recognizes that the mentally
disabled are at a disadvantage and, therefore, limits their capacity to consent
in certain legal situations.4 Under the legal theory ofparenspatriae, the state
may limit the power of a mentally disabled person to consent when the
individual is deemed incapable of making competent decisions concerning
a fundamental right.' Jewish law (Halacha) recognizes the same
disadvantages but approaches the issue from a less paternalistic vantage. The
obligation of society to aid the mentally incompetent person is considered
fulfilling the higher ideals of Halachic law.
This chapter examines in Part I the American jurisprudence in
fashioning safeguards for the protections of the mentally handicapped. Part
II explores the Jewish priority of evaluating the extent to which a mentally
incompetent person requires assistance by others in forming consent.
II. UNITED STATES LAW
In the United States, the capacity for the mentally disabled to consent
6
is governed by state laws and common law. Since there is a divergence of
standards in common law and the individual states have formulated their own
standards for consent, the standards applied are not identical. The standards
governing the capacity to consent, however, are usually determined by
evaluating the severity of the retardation.
The American Association on Mental Deficiency and the American
Psychiatric Association divide retardation into four classifications according
to intellectual functioning and adaptive behavior.7 These categories are mild,
3. See William Christian, Normalization as a Goal: The Americans with Disabilities Act
and Individuals with Mental Retardation, 73 TEx. L. REV. 409, 413 (1994).
4. See People v. Cratsley, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1164-65 (N.Y. 1995).
5. Id. at 1165.
6. In American jurisprudence, "consent" is a "voluntary agreement by a person in the
possession and exercise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent choice to do
something [or agree to something] proposed by another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 305
(6th ed. 1990).
7. See, e.g., Helvey v. Rednour, 408 N.E.2d 17, 21 (111. App. Ct. 1980) (stating the different
classifications of mental retardation used by the American Association on Mental Deficiency
and describing briefly how the magnitude of the disability can affect the outcome in an
adoption case); Patricia Werner, Terminating the Rights of Mentally Retarded Parents:
Severing the Ties that Bind, 22 J. MARSHALL. L. REv. 133, 133 n.l (1988) (discussing the
types of retardation used by the American Psychiatric Association).
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moderate, severe, and profound retardation.8  The differences in the
functioning level of each classification can be paramount in decisions
concerning whether a mentally disabled person has the capacity to consent.
When the patient is mildly retarded, the mentally disabled person is usually
held to be capable of giving consent. If the patient is profoundly retarded,
consent is normally assumed by either a guardian, the courts, or the state.
State laws concerning the capacity to consent demonstrate the myriad
of standards used to determine the severity of the retardation and whether a
mentally disabled person has the capacity to consent. This area of American
law is particularly fascinating since it adds another layer of debate to topics
which are not without their own intrinsic legal and public policy controversy.
The remainder of Part I of this chapter will explore how the issue of consent
by the mentally disabled is considered in deciding issues concerning
abortion, sterilization, adoption, participation in experimental medical
research, medical treatment, institutional commitment, and sexual acts.
A. Abortion
Courts have held that the decision of whether to carry to term or to abort
a child is a fundamental right held by all citizens including the mentally
retarded or incompetent.9 When a guardian is seeking an abortion for a
mentally retarded ward, a court will first consider whether the ward has the
capacity to consent. The court has to determine whether the ward, despite
8. There are four subtypes of mental retardation based on the Wechsler Intelligence
Quotient (IQ) ascribed to the person: (1) Mild: IQ 50-70. People within this range of
retardation are often not distinguishable from normal children until later in life. They can
generally learn academic skills until approximately the sixth-grade level and can usually
achieve vocational and social skills sufficient for self-support. About 80% of mentally
retarded people fall within this category; (2) Moderate: IQ 35-49. People falling within this
range of retardation are likely to progress to, but not beyond, the second-grade level. They
may be able to perform unskilled or semiskilled work when closely supervised. When under
stress, they may need supervision and guidance; (3) Severe: IQ 20-34. Approximately 7% of
the mentally retarded population falls within this range. They are generally unable to profit
from vocational training and often have poor motor development; (4) Profound: IQ below 20.
Less than 1% of the mentally retarded fall within this category. There may be impaired motor
development. A person in this category may develop minimal self-care skills, and requires
a highly structured and well-supervised environment. Werner, supra note 6, at 133 n.1
(quoting the AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 37-38 (3d ed. 1984)).
9. See In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d 682, 685 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (quoting In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d 712 (1982)) (the choice to "bear or beget a child is a right so fundamental that it must
be extended to all persons, including those who are incompetent.").
2000)
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her mental infirmity, is capable of making an informed decision.'° If the
ward can make an informed choice, then her decision is dispositive." If the
ward is deemed incapable of providing consent, the consent of the court or
family members can be substituted for the ward's consent depending upon
state statute. Courts are required to determine competency of a ward to
consent to an abortion. When a court determines that the capacity to consent
is lacking, some states use the doctrine of substituted judgment 2 or a best
interest test.1 3 Other states allow the authorized relative to have sole
discretion to consent.4
Substitutedjudgment directs thatjudges base their decisions on what the
incompetent person would decide "if he or she were competent." 5 This
doctrine does not state that the judge has to make the best decision in light
of the facts.' 6 Instead, "[t]he courts ... must endeavor, as accurately as
possible, to determine the wants and needs of this ward as they relate to the
abortion procedure."' 7 If the ward is deemed incompetent to make the
decision, the ward's expected preference is still a paramount consideration
under the substituted judgment doctrine. 8
The Massachusetts Appellate Court applied the substituted judgment
doctrine in In re Moe,' 9 The guardian, the patient's mother, sought an
abortion for her 24-year-old daughter who was pregnant for the fifth time and
had three previous abortions.20 The daughter, who was borderline mildly
retarded with an IQ in the high 70's to low 80's, also had a daughter who was
10. See id at 686 (citing In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 712).
11. See id. "Only if the ward is determined to be incompetent to make the decision is a
substituted judgment to be made." Id.
12. See infra notes 15-35 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 36-44 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
15. In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 720 (quoting In re Moe, 385 Mass. at 565).
16. See id.
17. See id. (quoting In re Moe, 385 Mass. at 566).
18. See id. at 720-721 (quoting In re Moe, 385 N.E.2d at 570).
Even if the ward is found incompetent to make the decision, the ward's
actual preference "is an important part of the substituted judgment
determination. The result of the judge's exercise of discretion shall be the
same decision which would be made by the incompetent person, 'but taking
into account the present and future incompetency of the individual as one
of the factors which would necessarily enter into the decision-making
process of the competent person."'
Id. (quoting Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 723).
19. See In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d at 685.
20. See id. at 683-84.
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primarily cared for by the guardian.2  The probate court denied the ward's
request for an abortion holding her to be incompetent to make decisions
concerning such procedures.22 Yet, the Appellate Court reversed the probate
court's order and granted petitioner the right to an abortion.23
The appellate court held that the determination that the ward had been
in need of a guardian due to her mental retardation was not dispositive in
reaching the determination that she was incompetent to consent to an
abortion.24 The court stated that "[a] person may be incompetent to make
some decisions but competent to make others. 25 The probate court judge
found that the patient was incompetent to make a decision concerning an
abortion because she did not know the length of her pregnancy. 26 The
appellate court, however, found this determination to be contrary to the
ward's expressed preference and also contrary to the evaluations of an expert
neurologist and psychologist who said the patient was competent to make the
abortion decision even though she was not competent to raise a child.27 The
appellate court concluded that reversal of the probate court was required
under the doctrine of substituted judgment regardless of the patient's
competency. The preference of the patient must be considered in the
decision and the probate judge did not adequately consider that preference.28
The probate court based its decision on the lack of medical necessity for
the procedure. 29 The appellate court determined that the medically essential
element is not a paramount consideration in the doctrine of substituted
judgment.3" While courts do not have to consider whether there is a
21. See id. at 684-685. For an explanation of the different types of retardation, see supra
note 8.
22. See id. at 685. Although the patient stated that she wanted the abortion, the probate
court found that since "there [was] no compelling medical reasons for the abortion, the Court
cannot state with clarity that it would be the ward's substituted judgment to assent to the
recommended treatment," and therefore denied the petition to consent to the abortion. Id.
23. See In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d at 684.
24. See id. at 686.
25. See id.
26. See id. (The probate judge did not make any specific finding as to the patient's
incompetency).
27. See id.
28. See id. at 686-87 ("In the absence of any evidence negating the ward's preference,...
we consider that, as a matter of law, the [probate] judge in applying the substituted judgment
analysis gave inadequate weight to the preference of the ward."). Id at 687.
29. See id. at 685 ("The judge's ruling denying the guardian's petition discounts the clear
preference of the ward and appears to be based on the lack of a compelling medical reason
for abortion."). Id.
30. See id. at 687.
2000]
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compelling medical reason or necessity for the performance of an abortion,3"
medical necessity can be considered in implementing the substituted
judgment doctrine.32 The appellate decision also affirms that "the present
and future incompetency of the individual" can be an included factor in the
substituted judgment doctrine."
There are jurisdictions which give broader power to guardians to act in
the best interest of the mentally retarded ward. In In re Estate ofD. W, the
Illinois Appellate Court opined that "[a]bsent any proof that the guardian was
not acting in the best interest of [the ward], the trial court had no legal basis
for denying the guardian's request for authority to consent to an abortion [for
the ward]."" The court held that the Illinois statute35 gives the guardian
broad authority to act as long as it is within the best interests of the ward.36
The court's role is to ensure that the decisions made by the guardian are in
the best interest of the ward and to intervene only when the guardian's acts
threaten to harm the mentally retarded person.3 7
In Estate of D. W., a mother was seeking authority to consent to an
abortion for her severely retarded 1 8-year-old daughter who possessed the
intelligence of a 5-year-old.38 The probate court denied the application for
authority because an abortion was not necessary for the protection of the life
or health of the patient. 39 The appellate court, however, found that there was
no evidence to refute that an abortion was in the best interests of the patient.
The appellate court reviewed the testimony of a psychologist, an
obstetrician/gynecologist, and the patient's mother. These witnesses
collectively testified that the young woman could not understand the
consequences of being pregnant, that the delivery would pose serious health
risks, and that the patient could not take care of herself or make rational
decisions concerning her pregnancy.4" Similar to the court's reasoning in In
re Moe, the court in Estate ofD. W. held that "there is no legal requirement
31. See id. at 687; see also In re Estate of D.W., 481 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
32. See In re Moe, 579 N.E.2d at 687 (citing In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 722 n. 10).
33. See id. at 686 (citing In re Moe, 432 N.E.2d at 723).
34. In re Estate ofD. W, 481 N.E.2d 355, 357 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
35. See 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11 a-17 (West 1992). This statute was cited in Estate
ofD. W. and the language was formerly found in 110 1/2 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1 la-17(a).
36. See In re Estate of D.W., 481 N.E.2d at 356.
37. See id. at 356-357.
38. See id. at 355.
39. See id. at 356.
40. See id.
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that a medical necessity exist before a guardian can consent to an abortion for
a ward.
41
New York law provides the broadest authority for family members to
consent to an abortion for a mentally retarded woman, allowing the court to
resolve only whether the patient can give consent.42 The court only makes
the ultimate decision of whether an abortion should be performed when there
are no family members.43 When the "substantial judgment" of an appropriate
relative is available, the court need not apply the "best interest" standard that
demands a judge's subjective opinion.4 Under New York law, the director
of a medicare facility needs the consent of the patient 45 or of a person who is
authorized to act on behalf of the patient, such as a spouse, parent, adult
child, or court, before performing surgery.46
In In re Barbara C., a director of a mental health facility sought
permission to perform an abortion on a profoundly retarded 25-year-old with
the equivalent mental age of two. 47  Barbara was held to be "clearly
incapable of giving such consent,"48 but the court did not provide any
analysis as to her inability to consent beyond finding her mental age being
that of a 2-year-old. The court held that once the patient is considered
incompetent to make the decision, then the relative can consent.49 If there is
an available relative, then the court only determines whether the patient can
41. See id. at 357.
42. See In re Barbara C., 474 N.Y.S.2d 799, 801 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ("[W]here an
appropriate relative is available to grant or deny consent, the sole role of the judiciary is to
resolve any dispute which may arise concerning the patient's ability to grant consent. Once
the incapacity of the patient to consent has been established, the institution may rely on the
consent of the patient's prescribed relative .... ). See id.
43. See id. (stating that if a mentally retarded female does not have any "prescribed
relatives is available to give consent," then the court has to exercise itsparenspatriae power
to determine whether the procedure is in the best interests of the patient). See id.
44. See id.
45. See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 33.03(b)(4) (McKinney 1996) (stating that the director
needs to obtain consent for "surgery [or] major medical treatment in the nature of surgery.").
46. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 27.9(b); see also Barbara C., 474
N.Y.S.2d at 801.
47. See In relBarbara C. at 800; see also In re Barbara C., 455 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (Sup.
Ct. 1982); see also supra, note 8 (for a discussion of the classifications of mental retardation).
48. In re Barbara C., 474 N.Y.S.2d at 800.
49. See id. (stating that when a patient's incapacity to consent is beyond legal question, an
institution can accept consent from an authorized relative without judicial review).
2000]
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consent." If no relative is available, judicial approval must be sought, and
only at this point will the court consider the best interests of the patient.51
In analyzing these cases, we conclude that the common thread
connecting differing jurisdictions concerning standards of consent is that
courts will base the capacity to consent to abortion primarily on a
determination of the severity of the mental retardation.
B. Sterilization
The laws concerning sterilization place emphasis on consent being
obtained from the mentally retarded person. Similar to considerations
regarding ability to consent to an abortion, courts have found that consent for
sterilizations can be delegated on behalf of a mentally disabled individual.
The first consideration is whether a mentally retarded patient can give
consent to the sterilization. 2 Many mentally retarded people are "capable of
understanding the implications of sterilization and the responsibilities of
parenthood, and are competent to make a decision regarding sterilization. 53
A mentally retarded patient is capable of consenting to sterilization if the
patient "understands the nature of the district court's proceedings, the
relationship between sexual activity and reproduction and the consequences
of the sterilization procedure. 54 This understanding, however, need not
include a technical knowledge of bodily functions or an understanding of the
possible complications or risks resulting from a sterilization procedure. 5
The patient also does not need to understand the risks associated with
pregnancy or childbirth to have the capacity to consent. 6 Furthermore, a
court cannot say that a person is incompetent to give consent just because the
decision made by the individual may be considered unreasonable. 7
These standards were applied in In re Romero where a guardian, the
mother of the patient, petitioned the court for an order to sterilize her thirty-
seven year-old daughter who had two children. 8 The patient was mildly
impaired due to oxygen deprivation resulting in brain damage when she was
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819, 822 (Colo. 1990).
53. See id.
54. See id. at 823.
55. See id.
56. Seeid.




thirty-three.59 The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the patient had the
capacity to withhold consent to the procedure. 60 She had an intelligence
quotient of 74, barely higher than the quotient of 70, below which a person
is legally considered mentally retarded.6' In addition, her testimony was
articulate, she demonstrated an understanding of the court procedure, and
expressly stated that she wanted the ability to have additional children.62 She
also showed an understanding that it would be risky having a child as a
diabetic, but asserted that she wanted the option of having more children if
her condition improved.63 The court concluded that "a court's role is not to
pass judgment upon the wisdom of Ms. Romero's decision or the importance
she assigns to potential risks and benefits. If Ms. Romero is competent to
make a decision, she must remain free to do so . . . ." Therefore, the
sterilization order was denied.64
Other considerations in sterilization cases are whether the procedure is
medically essential 65 or in the retarded patient's best interests. 66 These
analyses are applied only after the petitioner demonstrates that the patient is
incompetent to consent and that their ability to give consent will not improve
over time.67 When the patient is adjudicated to be incompetent to make the
decision, most states use some type of variation of the medically essential
and best interests tests. The best interests analysis includes the wishes of the
person, and states that the person's desire not to be sterilized must weigh
heavily against authorizing the procedure., 68 A procedure is considered
medically essential if it is "clearly necessary to preserve the life or physical
or mental health" of the mentally retarded individual. 69 The medically
essential test can include different components, such as the medical risks of
59. See id. at 820.
60. See id. at 823.
61. See id. at 823.
62. See In re Romero at 823.
63. See id. at 824.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 822; see also Chasse v. Mazerolle, 580 A.2d 155 (Me. 1990) (holding that
in order to get a sterilization order it is necessary to demonstrate that the procedure would
prevent further mental deficiency or that the physical or mental condition of the person would
be improved).
66. See generally In re Romero, 790 P.2d 819.
67. See id.
68. In re A.W., 637 P.2d 366, 372 (Colo. 1981).
69. See id at 372.
2000]
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sterilization,7° whether alternative methods of contraception are available to
the patient,7 and whether the mentally disabled patient is likely to engage in
72 73intercourse or is capable of becoming pregnant.
Another issue is who is allowed to give consent when the mentally
retarded person is deemed incapable of giving consent. Most states delegate
this role to the courts and not to the guardians.74 Some courts have noted that
allowing the parents or guardians to substitute their decision and consent is
not adequate since parental consent to sterilization has a history of being
abused, and it cannot be presumed that they have the same interests as their
child.75 This is a significant point of departure from permitted delegated
consent in abortion, where parents and guardians are given the responsibility
more frequently. Courts may be less inclined to allow for the possibility of
self-interested third parties when the result of consent permanently impacts
future choices in the life of the mentally disabled individual.
C. Adoption
The ability to adopt the child of a mentally disabled parent hinges upon
the termination of the disabled parent's parental rights. When the parent is
mentally disabled, the ability to obtain the parent's consent is complex and
varies between states, but is always determined pursuant to a hearing.76 The
majority of states hold that the capacity to consent is determined by analyzing
whether the parent is capable of caring for the child, and/or considerations
of the best interest of the child.
Initially, a hearing must be held to determine the capacity and fitness of
the mentally retarded parent. In Helvey v. Rednour,7 7 the Illinois Appellate
70. See In re Welfare of Hillstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 874, 877 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
71. See id. See also In re A.W., 637 P.2d at 376.
72. See In re Welfare of Hillstrom, 363 N.W.2d 871, 874; see also In re A. W., 637 P.2d at
376.
73. See id at 877; see also In re A. W, 637 P.2d at 376.
74. See In re Welfare of Hillstrom, 363 N.W.2d at 875 ("[The laws] provide for
sterilization when the mentally retarded person cannot make a personal procreative choice,
and the exercise of the personal procreative right must come from the court."); see also In re
A.W., 637 P.2d at 375 (stating that neither the parents or guardians, or a mentally retarded
minor, can consent to sterilization without a court order).
75. See, e.g., In re A.W., 637 P.2d at 370 ("The inconvenience of caring for the
incompetent child coupled with fears of sexual promiscuity or exploitation may lead parents
to seek a solution which infringes their offspring's fundamental procreative rights."). Id.
76. Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981) (holding that the
requirements of due process need to be met to terminate parental rights).
77. 408 N.E.2d 17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
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Court held that the Illinois Adoption Act 78 was unconstitutional because it
appointed a guardian ad litem with the power to consent to adoption for
mentally retarded parents. 79 This act was held unconstitutional because it
omitted a fitness hearing, a violation of the Equal Protection and the Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. ° Since there was no
requirement in the statute mandating a "finding of parental unfitness as a
condition precedent to the appointment of the guardian," the statute "creates
a presumption that all retarded parents are unfit, which is unconstitutional."81
The court stated that although the right to procreate and raise children is a
fundamental right,82 the right of the mentally retarded to raise children is not
absolute.83 This right can be curtailed by the state if there is a compelling
interest.84 The court states that this right can be impaired if it is in the best
interests of the child.85 The court held that a fitness hearing is required and
if the parent is determined to be unfit, then their consent to the adoption will
be waived. The best interests of the child are paramount, but if unfitness
cannot be established, then the welfare of the child becomes de minimis.
86
The court notes that these hearings are important in cases of mild mental
retardation where the parents may be capable of raising a child but may still
be considered disabled.
Any presumption of unfitness is particularly inappropriate
when it involves parents who fall into the mildly retarded
category. Since these parents are borderline cases, it cannot be
said with certainty whether they are in fact retarded or, if they
are, whether they display a character trait deemed to render
them unfit to raise children.87
78. ILL. STAT., ch. 40, 1501 et seq. (1977). This statute is now located at 750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 50/1 et seq.
79. See Helvey, 408 N.E.2d. at 23.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 20.
82. See id. at 21 (citing Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); see also Carey v.
Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
83. SeeHelvey, 408 N.E.2d 17, 21.
84. See id.
85. See id.
86. See id. at 22.
87. See id. at 21, 22.
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During the hearing process, courts decide whether to terminate parental
rights by using a combination of parental fitness and best interests of the
child tests to determine whether the mentally retarded parent has the ability
to consent. In Adoption of Abigail,88 the court declared that the mental
retardation ofa parent is not sufficient grounds for the termination of parental
rights.89 For the parental rights to be terminated, it is necessary to show that
the mental retardation affects the parent's fitness or the child's well-being.9 °
This is a factual determination which is taken on a case-by-case basis.
In Abigail, the mother was mildly mentally retarded, but her condition was
deemed severe enough that she could not care for her mentally retarded
daughter. The court noted that "[i]f the question were simply one of the
mother's limited intelligence, matched with a child of normal needs, there
might not be a lawful basis for the radical step of terminating the link
between natural mother and child." 91 But the mother was of such limited
judgment,92 the court held that she was incapable of administering the child's
required medication and performing the child's speech and physical
therapy.93 "[These] activities require concentration and orderliness which
cannot reasonably be expected of someone with the mother's limited
abilities."94 The court agreed with the probate judge's application of the
combined parental fitness and best interests analysis and with the judge's
conclusion that "the mother's deficits, matched with Abigail's deficits, would
put the child's welfare greatly at hazard."95
Similarly, in In re A.M.K.,96 the parental rights of a mildly retarded
father with a personality disorder and a borderline retarded mother with an
IQ in the low 80s were terminated because they were incapable of caring for
their developmentally and physically disabled child.97 The Department of
Social Services provided them with training to care for their child and to
88. 499 N.E.2d 1234 (Mass. App. Ct. 1986).
89. See id. at 1237 (citing Petition of the Dept. of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent
to Adoption, 20 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 696 & n. 4 (1985)).
90. See id. (citing Petition of the Dept. of Social Servs. to Dispense with Consent to
Adoption, 392 Mass. 696, 701 (1984)).
91. See id.
92. See id. at 1236.
93. See id. at 1237.
94. See id.
95. See id. (citing Petition of the New England Home for Little Wanderers to Dispense
with Consent to Adoption, 328 N.E.2d 854 (Mass. 1975); Petition of Catholic Charitable
Bureau to Dispense with Consent to Adoption, 430 N.E.2d 1245 (Mass. 1982)).
96. 420 N.W.2d 718 (1988).
97. See id. at 719.
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administer the child's physical therapy,98 but the parents were unable to do
so.99 The juvenile court terminated the parental rights,'00 and the appellate
court agreed,' because a court may terminate parental rights when it is in
the best interests of the child to do so and "[when] '[t]he parents are unable
to discharge parental responsibilities because of mental illness or mental
deficiency and there are reasonable grounds to believe that such condition
will continue for a prolonged indeterminate period."'
0 2
Some states only consider whether the parent is capable of caring for the
child as the standard as to whether a mentally disabled parent is capable of
consent. In New York, it is not necessary to obtain the consent of a mentally
retarded parent in order for the child to be adopted. 0 3 Nevertheless, New
York has produced guidelines which must be followed to ensure that the due
process rights of all parties are protected.'04 In In re Caroline,°5 the child of
mildly mentally retarded parents was adopted in a private placement
adoption' 6 by the sister and brother-in-law of the father who were raising the
child. 7 The parents retained the right to visit the child at least once a
week. 10 8 Adoption without the consent of the mentally disabled parents is
allowed when it is shown by clear and convincing proof that they are not
capable of caring for the child.'0 9
98. See id.
99. See id. at 720.
100. See id. at 719.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 720 (citing NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-292(5) (Reissue 1984)).
103. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §11 1(2)(d) (McKinney 1988) (stating that a court can
dispense with parental consent of parents who by reason of mental retardation is presently and
for the foreseeable future unable to provide for a child).
104. See In re Adoptions of Michael S. & Samantha S., 607 N.Y.S.2d 214, 215 (Fain. Ct.
1993) (stating that proceedings must be originated by an authorized agency or foster parent
in a public placement; whereas in a private placement the legal guardian must be notified and
the court will usually notify all parties believed to be necessary for the adoption).
105. 638 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1996).
106. A private placement adoption is "any adoption other than that of a minor who has
been placed for adoption by an authorized agency .... " Id. at 998 (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 109(5) (McKinney 1988)).
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 999. New York law states that "consent shall not be required of a parent
... who, by reason of... mental retardation.., is presently and for the foreseeable future
unable to provide proper care for the child." Id. (quoting N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 11 l(2)(d)
(McKinney 1988)). Social Services Law § 384-b(6)(b) defines mental retardation as
"subaverage intellectual functioning which originates during the developmental period and
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An additional issue concerning the mentally retarded parent's capacity
to consent is raised by cases where parents want to rescind their consent after
the adoption has occurred. If a mentally retarded parent attempts to
withdraw consent, the court has to determine whether the mentally retarded
person initially gave informed and intelligent consent to the adoption.110 In
Good v. Zavala,"' this issue was presented when a mildly retarded mother
withdrew her consent to the adoption of her daughter after signing a consent
agreement. 12 While the mother recognized that she could not raise her
daughter, she sought advice concerning adoption and its legal alternatives,
and understood that if she gave her daughter up for adoption, she would no
longer be her child's legal mother.' 13 The court in rejecting the withdrawal
of consent opined that the mother "formed a sane, rational, and intelligent
decision to give her daughter up for adoption; that [she] gave a knowing,
informed, and intelligent consent to the adoption; and that she understood the
important ramification of her consent to the adoption of her child."
'"14
Some courts also consider the ability to nullify an adoption as a contract
matter. In such a situation, the burden to prove incapacity to contract is on
the mentally retarded parent, and must be proven by convincing evidence.' 15
In In re Adoption of Smith, the mother, who was mildly retarded, wanted to
invalidate her written surrender of her children because she did not
comprehend that she was giving up her parental rights."6 The adoptive
is associated with impairment in adaptive behavior to such an extent that if such child were
placed in or returned to the custody of the parent, the child would be in danger of becoming
a neglected child .. " A determination under the foregoing subdivision that a parent, by
reason of mental retardation, is presently and for the foreseeable future unable to properly and
adequately care for his or her child must be supported by clear and convincing proof. Id.
(internal citations omitted). For more on the clear and convincing standard of proof, see In
re Inquiry into J.L.B. Youth in Need of Care, 594 P.2d 1127 (Mont. 1979) (holding that a
borderline mentally retarded mother did not have the power to consent to the adoption
because she was proven to be an unfit parent by substantial credible evidence). Id. at 1137.
110. See, e.g., Good v. Zavala, 531 So. 2d 909, 910 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988) ("A natural
parent's mere change of mind cannot justify a rescission of the natural parent's consent to an
adoption provided the natural parent gave an informed, intelligent consent and all of the
procedural safeguards were followed.)" Id. (citing Ex Parte Nice, 429 So. 2d 265 (Ala.
1982)).
111. See 531 So. 2d 909 (Ala. Civ. App. 1988).
112. Seeid. at 910.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See In re Adoption of Smith, 578 So. 2d 988, 992 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
116. See id. at 989-990. The court noted that she has the ability to remember addresses,
numbers, and birthdays, but reads at only a second grade level and does not understand
concrete words. See id.
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parents were trusted friends and neighbors of the mother. They cared for two
of her children while the third was in the hospital, and aided the mother with
shopping and paying bills.' i However, the mother was dependent on the
adoptive parents and was induced into signing the agreement." 18 The court
held that the consent was void because she did not understand the
repercussions of her act.1 9 Without such an understanding, there could have
been no meeting of the minds and, therefore, the consent for the adoption
was rescinded using basic contract theory.
1 20
D. Participation Experimental Medical Research
There have been several instances of experimental research performed
without consent on the mentally retarded and the vulnerable in this
country. 2' Although the abuse of experimentation on the vulnerable is
117. See id. at 990-991.
118. See id. at 993.
119. See id.
120. See id. at 994.
121. See Diane E. Hoffman & Jack Schwartz, Proxy Consent to Participation of the
Decisionally Impaired in Medical Research-Maryland's Policy Initiative, 1 J. HEALTH CARE
L. & POL'Y 123,135-136 (1998). For examples of nonconsensual medical experimentation
on the mentally disabled, see, e.g., Barrett v. U.S., 660 F. Supp. 1291 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(discussing the experimentation of a mescaline derivative on a mental patient to test potential
chemical warfare); T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015,
1017 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff'd650N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appealdismissed
by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997)
(deciding a case brought by mental patients who were involved in non-consentual potentially
high-risk experiments including anti-psychotic drugs and drugs not approved by the Food and
Drug Administration); Michael J. Loscialpo, Nontherapeutic Human Research Experiments
on Institutionalized Mentally Retarded Children: Civil Rights and Remedies, 23 NEW ENG.
J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 139, 143-45 (1997) (discussing research performed at the
Fernald State School in Massachusetts where mentally retarded boys were given radioactive
calcium and iron tracers in their breakfast cereal without the consent of their parents); id. at
181 n. 11 (describing the deliberate infection of mentally retarded children without consent
at the Willowbrook State School).
For additional examples of nonconsensual experimentation on vulnerable people,
see, e.g., Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (vacating an order dismissing
a prisoner's case because the nonconsensual administration of a nontherapeutic "fright drug"
was sufficient to prove cruel and unusual punishment); Loscialpo, supra, at 181 n. 11
(discussing the 1932 Tuskegee Syphilis study where researchers injected 400 syphilis infected
and 200 healthy African-American men with drugs containing heavy metals without the
patients' consent, and the instance when researchers from the Strong Memorial Hospital,
Rochester, New York, injected eleven people with radioactive material as part of a Manhattan
Project study in order to set standards for workers who were involved in making atomic
bombs).
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unjust, research is needed to develop new medical treatments for the
mentally ill and disabled. 2 2 The need for incompetent subjects is sometimes
crucial to performing these tests. However, this is complicated since the
rights of the mentally retarded and mentally ill have to be protected, and
especially since medical experimentation can have severe consequences and
many mentally disabled individuals do not have the capacity to consent to
such tests. 123
The possibility of severe side affects due to experimental medical
research has resulted in the courts categorizing research into two
areas-therapeutic and non-therapeutic. Most of the experimental research
performed on the mentally retarded consists of therapeutic research. 24
Therapeutic research is experimentation with new drugs or medical
procedures which is meant to provide a medical benefit to the subject.
125
These cases are rarely contested due to the fact that the state has an interest
in furthering medical treatments available to the mentally retarded. In the
case of therapeutic experiments, there is a valid state interest in promoting
the health of the mentally retarded. This interest may even outweigh the
liberty interests of a vulnerable child where the child would benefit from the
122. See TD. 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1016 ("[T]he benefits of planned and objective research on
human beings ... are self-evident for the intelligent development of effective therapeutic
modalities with minimization of unanticipated and detrimental side effects .... There comes
a time, before a new treatment can be accepted, when there must be an assessment of
controlled experiments with human beings."); see also T.D. v. New York State Office of
Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680
N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997):
[T]he controversy [concerning medical experimentation on incompetents]
has wide significance since it arises within the larger context of medical
research involving human subjects, and necessarily requires a balancing of
this State's responsibility to protect individuals who, because of mental
illness, age, birth defect, other disease or some combination of these
factors, are incapable of speaking for themselves, from needless pain,
indignity and abuse, against its worthwhile goal of fostering the
development of better methods to diagnose, treat and otherwise care for
these same individuals through cooperation with the medical community
and private industry.
123. See T.D., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1016-17 (stating that there is a "need to balance the
demands of scientific research with the rights of the individual human beings who may be the
subject of experiments," and that this has led to the court system, legislators and advocates
to try to develop procedures which will allow "effective research while safeguarding the
rights of the individual."); see also TD., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 177 (recognizing the state's
concurrent responsibilities to conduct research to prevent and treat future mental disorders
and to care for the mentally challenged in its care).
124. See TD., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
125. See TD., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1018.
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results of the experimentation. The use of mentally competent
noninstitutionalized children, however, would not serve this interest.1
26
It is harder to justify or get consent for non-therapeutic experimentation
on the mentally disabled since the treatment does not benefit the patient, but
seeks to obtain knowledge which may help future patients. 127  Non-
therapeutic research may involve treatments that involve "more than minimal
risk." 128 These procedures include those "which may cause stroke, heart
attack, convulsions, hallucinations, or other diseases and disabilities
including death, and which, while possibly shedding light on possible future
treatments to others, offer no direct therapeutic benefit to the participating
subject. 1 29  Successful applications to the court for non-therapeutic
experimentation are rare since the state has a lesser interest due to the
vulnerability of the patient, since mentally disabled people cannot give
consent to possibly harmful treatments, and since there is rarely an
"acceptable reason why such research cannot be conducted with subjects who
are free and fully competent."' 130 Most case law concerns non-therapeutic
experimentation on the mentally retarded.131 In these cases, it is necessary
first to consider whether the mentally retarded individual is capable of
providing informed consent to experimental research and, if not, if a
surrogate, give consent on their behalf.
Informed consent is the "knowing consent of an individual or his legally
authorized representative, with sufficient capacity to consent and so situated
to be able to exercise free power of choice .... The ability to consent is
determined by establishing whether the patient can "understand the purpose,
126. See Loscialpo, supra note 121, at 156 (discussing the causes of action available to
subjects ofnon-consensual experimental research involving radioactive substances when they
were children).
127. See TD., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1018; see also Loscialpo, supra note 121, at 153.
128. See TD., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1018.
129. Id. at 1017. See also TD., 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 185 ("[E]xperiments involving more
than minimal risk expose the subjects to . . .invasive and painful procedures and/or the
administration ofpsychotropic drugs, antipsychotic drugs and other medications, which have
harmful side effects as severe or even worse than similar medications and procedures
currently used for treatment.").
130. See Loscialpo, supra note 121, at 156 (citing Statement of ABA Commission on the
Mentally Disabled before National Human Experimentation Group, MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 156-57 (1997)).
131. See, e.g., TD., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 177, 184 (stating that the plaintiffs did not challenge
procedures used for minimal risk experiments and that the "large majority of studies, which
are therapeutic and/or proceed upon the informed consent of subjects ...will remain
unaffected [by this decision].").
132. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10(c)(4).
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nature, risks, benefits and alternatives (including nonparticipation) of the
research, to make a decision about participation, and to understand that the
decision about participation in the research will involve no penalty or loss of
benefits to which the patient is otherwise entitled." '133
If the research is federally funded, the federal regulation takes
precedence over the state statutes and common law. 134 Federal law has very
stringent consent requirements. 135 Under federal regulations, the consent for
non-therapeutic procedures must be documented in writing.'36  This
requirement is not necessary for therapeutic experiments. 13 7 In order for the
consent to be informed, it is required that "all foreseeable risks" must be
disclosed to the patient.3 3 Finally, all experimental research must be
133. See T.D., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1019 n.6 (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14,
§ 527.10(c)(2)).
134. See T.D.,626 N.Y.S.2d 1015, 1023 (1995) ("[A]ll federally funded research is subject
to the federal regulations promulgated by the United States Department of Health and Human
Services... for the protection of human subjects[, but federal regulations] do not affect the
applicability of any additional protections provided to human subjects by state or local laws.
... 1").
135. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (1997) ("[N]o investigator may involve a human being as a
subject in research covered by this policy unless the investigator has obtained the legally
effective informed consent of the subject or the subject's legally authorized representative.").
To obtain legally effective consent, the patient or representative has to have "sufficient
opportunity to consider whether or not to participate and to minimize the possibility of
coercion or undue influence." Id. The information provided to the subject has to be in
understandable common language, the subject's legal rights cannot be waived, and the
investigator, sponsor, or the institution cannot be released from negligence liability. See id.
136. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117 (1997) ("[L]nformed consent shall be documented by the use
of a written consent form approved by the IRB [institutional review board] and signed by the
subject or the subject's representative.").
137. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.117(c)(2) (stating that the IRB may waive the signed consent
requirement if "the research presents no more than minimal risk of harm to subjects and
involves no procedures for which written consent is normally required outside of the research
context"); see also 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d)(1) (stating that the IRB may approve
experimentation even if all the elements of consent are not met or can waive the requirements
to obtain consent if "[t]he research involves no more than minimal risk to the subjects"); 45
C.F.R. § 46.117(c)(1). It is up to the subject as to whether or not to take documentation
associating them with the experiment. See id.
138. 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(a)(2). To gain informed consent the subject needs to be provided
with the following information:
(1) A statement that the study involves research, an explanation of the
purposes of the research and the expected duration of the subject's
participation, a description of the procedures to be followed, and
identification of any procedures which are experimental;
(2) A description of any reasonably foreseeable risks or discomforts to the
subject;
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approved by an institutional review board (IRB). 139 The IRB approves of
experimental procedures only if the risks to the patient are reasonable and if
informed consent can be obtained. Although federal regulations provide
greater protection than state law, they do not include specific provisions on
the rights of surrogates to make decisions on behalf of incompetents. The
regulations only state that informed consent can be obtained from the
"subject's legally authorized representative." 140  The "legally authorized
representative" is defined as any "individual or judicial or other body
authorized under applicable law to consent on behalf of a prospective subject
to the subject's participation in the procedure(s) involved in the research."14'
This imprecise language appears to designate state or local law to determine
who the surrogate for consent will be and the procedures for giving
consent. 1
42
Whether the experimental research is being conducted under federal or
state law, many mentally disabled patients are incapable of giving consent to
(3) A description of any benefits to the subject or others which may
reasonably be expected from the research;
(4) A disclosure of appropriate alternative procedures or courses of
treatment, if any, that may be advantageous to the subject;
(5) A statement describing the extent, if any, to which confidentiality of
records identifying the subject will be maintained;
(6) For research involving more than minimal risk, an explanation as to
whether any compensation and an explanation as to whether any medical
treatments are available if injury occurs and, if so, what they consist of or
where further information may be obtained;
(7) An explanation of whom to contact for answers to pertinent questions
about the research and the research subjects' rights, and whom to contact
in the event of a research-related injury to the subject; and
(8) A statement that participation is voluntary, refusal to participate will
involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise
entitled, and the subject may discontinue participation at any time without
penalty or loss of benefits to which the subject is otherwise entitled.
Id. § 46.116(a). There are also additional elements of informed consent which may be
appropriate depending on the type of research. See id. § 46.116(b) (stating additional
elements such as possible unforeseeable risks, possible circumstances leading to the
termination of the experiment, any costs that will have to be assessed to the subject,
consequences of withdrawing from the research, a statement of findings resulting from the
research, and the number of people in the study).
139. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.108(b) (stating that approval must come from a majority of the
IRB members at the meeting).
140. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116.
141. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(c).
142. See 45 C.F.R. § 46.116(e) ("The informed consent requirements in this policy are not
intended to preempt any applicable federal, state, or local laws which require additional
information to be disclosed in order for informed consent to be legally effective.").
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experimental treatment and, therefore, many states provide for a surrogate to
make decisions on behalf of the mentally retarded patient. Some states have
responded to the consent problem by prohibiting incompetent persons from
participating in experimental medicine, 43 but most states allow for a
surrogate, either the mentally disabled patient's guardian or relative or a
court, to approve experimental treatment. 144 Surrogate consent statutes apply
143. See id. See also Mo. ANN. STAT. § 630.115(8) (West Supp. 1997) (prohibiting
involuntary patients in state mental health facilities from participating in experimental
research); ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.830(a) (Michie 1996) (prohibiting mental health facilities
from performing experiments which have a "significant risk of physical or psychological
harm" on mental patients); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health, I Mental
Disability L.Rep. 147 (1976) (holding that experimental surgery could not be performed on
mentally incompetent patients even if a surrogate decision maker consented); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 5175(f) (1995) (prohibiting pharmaceutical research on patients in state mental
facilities if they are "incapable of understanding the nature and consequences of his
consent"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5174 (1995) (prohibiting certain state mental hospital
patients from being subjects in medical research regardless of competency); MASS. REGS.
CODE tit. 104, §§ 13.01-.05 (1995) (prohibiting non-therapeutic and high risk research on
mental patients).
144. For examples of states statutes allowing the legal guardian or relatives to be the
surrogate, see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 24175(b)(2) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB.
CODE § 2355(a) (West 1991) (permitting conservator of patient who has not been adjudicated
to lack the capacity to provide consent to medical experimentation when the patient does not
object to participation or when there is a medical emergency); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 24175(b)(2) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB. CODE § 2355(a) (West 1991) (permitting
conservator of patient who has been adjudicated to lack the capacity to provide consent to
give consent even over the objections of the patient); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
24175(d) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 4512(a), 4655(c) (West 1991) (allowing
another person to provide consent for a developmentally disabled person who lacks consent
if there is no conservator); COLO. REV. STAT. § 27-10.5-114(7) (1990) (stating that consent
can be given by a competent developmentally disabled adult patient or a legal guardian); FLA.
STAT. § 393.13(4)(c) (Supp. 1991) (allowing consent from a competent mentally-retarded
patient, a legal guardian, or the patient's parents); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-8-108(c) (1991)
(stating the patient or guardian can consent); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34-B, §5605.8.G
(1988) (stating that consent can be provided by the mentally- retarded patient or a guardian
if the patient is incompetent); Mo. REV. STAT. § 630.115(8) (1986) (stating consent can be
acquired from the mentally-retarded patient or the patient's guardian); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAW § 2444(2) (McKinney 1996) (requiring consent of the mentally-retarded subject, the
institution's human research review committee, and the Commissioner of Public Health); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 40.1-22.1-5(4) (1991) (allowing the mentally-retarded patient to consent if
competent, otherwise a legal guardian or court may consent); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1- 84.1(4)
(Michie 1996)(stating that the mental health patient, guardian, or committee may consent);
WYO. STAT. § 25-5-132(d)(ii) (1990) (allowing consent to be obtained from the mentally-
retarded patient, court, guardian, parent, or guardian ad litem).
For examples of state statutes which require judicial intervention, see CAL. HEALTH
& SAFETY CODE § 24175(b)(1) (West 1992) and CAL. PROB. CODE § 2354 (West 1991)
(requiring that a conservator of a mental patient who has not been adjudicated to be
incompetent obtain a court order before consenting on the patient's behalf where the patient
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when the incompetent patient or the courts have not appointed an agent.'45
The statutes allow the surrogate to make medical decisions for the patient
based on substituted judgment or upon the patients best interest.146 Surrogate
statutes normally have a priority ranking of those authorized to make
decisions, starting with a spouse, and followed by adult children, parents and
adult siblings. 7 Some even include more distant relatives and friends. 148 In
the realm of experimental medical research, surrogate laws are troublesome
since most of them do not explicitly address consent to participation in
medical research,' 49 and they do not specify how the surrogate should make
decisions for the incompetent person. It is difficult, therefore, to discern
whether or not the surrogate is actually protecting the best interests and the
rights of the patient.
refuses to consent); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-677(e) (West Supp. 1997) (allowing a
guardian to consent to experimental research or procedures only "if it is intended to preserve
the life or prevent serious impairment of the physical health of the ward or it is intended to
assist the ward to regain his abilities and has been approved for that person by the court");
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 5174(1) (mentally-ill defendants and prisoners cannot participate
in pharmaceutical research without their informed consent and court approval); 405 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-110 (West 1993) (providing that a guardian or parent cannot consent
to experimental treatments without approval of the court and a determination that the
treatment is in the best interests of the patient); MINN. STAT. § 525.56(3)(4)(a), (b) (1991)
(forbidding a guardian to consent to experimental research without approval of the court
which must consider the best interests of the patient); NEV. REV. STAT. § 159.0805 (1986)
(requiring that a guardian must be empowered by a court to consent to experimental medical
treatment); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464-A:25(1)(c)-(e) (1995) (establishing that a court can
authorize a guardian to consent to experimental treatment after finding that the treatment is
in the best interests of the patient); N.J. REV. STAT. § 30:6D-5.a.(4) (1981) (stating that a
guardian ad litem appointed by a court to give consent may consent to experimentation for
a developmentally disabled patient); OKLA. STAT. tit. 30, § 3-119(3) (1991) (stating that the
guardian needs authorization from the court to consent to the ward's involvement in
experimental research).
145. See Hoffman & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 131 (citing ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT
To DIE § 14.4, at 253 (2d ed. 1995).
146. See id. (citing MEISEL, supra note 144, § 14.8, at 263-66).
147. See id. (citing MEISEL, supra note 144, § 14.4, at 254).
148. See id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-605(a)(2)(vi) (1994)).
149. See Hoffman & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 131 (stating that in "determining
whether the health care decision-making laws encompass research will require attention to
the specific definition of health care in the statutes or to an inference from the other parts of
the statutes to determine whether they should be interpreted to apply to any type of research,
potentially therapeutic or otherwise.").
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Many states attempt to rectify this problem by instituting a research
review committee similar to the federal IRB. 5° New York State has been at
the forefront of attempting to provide standards for experimental research
performed on the mentally impaired. 51 New York requires more than just
the voluntary informed consent of the mentally retarded subject. 5 2 The New
York statute creates a "human research review committee,'' 53 and requires
the consent of this committee as well as the Commissioner of the Department
of Health for any experimental research involving the mentally disabled. 1
54
The New York State Office of Mental Health created further procedures for
the participation of patients who do not possess the capacity to provide
informed consent in high-risk research.'55 Similar to the federal procedures,
the New York regulations required that the informed consent of the patient
or of the legally authorized representative' 56 had to be obtained and
documented, 157 and that all experimental research on human subjects must
be reviewed by an IRB.'58 The IRB had to document that the study cannot
be conducted without the incompetent subjects and that the research will
150. See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 126; see also 12 VA. ADMIN. CODE 5-
20-40 (Michie 1997); N.Y. PUB.HEALTHLAW § 2444(2) (McKinney 1996) (requiring consent
of the mentally-retarded subject, the institution's human research review committee, and the
Commissioner of Public Health). Virginia's statute states that an incompetent may "[n]ot be
the subject of experimental or investigational research without his prior written and informed
consent or that of his legally authorized representative," but does not define "legally
authorized representative." VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-84.1 (Michie 1996). This appears to
provide little protection for those patients lacking capacity. See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra
note 122, at 126. "However, regulations promulgated under the statute provide that 'In]on-
therapeutic research using patients or residents within an institution [for the mentally ill or
mentally retarded] is forbidden unless it is determined by the research review committee that
such non-therapeutic research will not present greater than minimal risk."' See id. at 126-27
(quoting 12 VA. ADMiN. CODE 5-20-40 (Michie 1997)).
151. See Hoffmann & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 127.
152. See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2442 (McKinney 1993).
153. See id. § 2444
154. See id. § 2444(2) ("[T]he consent of the committee and the commissioner shall be
required with relation to the conduct of human research involving ... incompetent persons
[and] mentally disabled persons .... ).
155. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10 (1990). This law was repealed as of
July 1, 1998.
156. A legally authorized representative is the patient's spouse, parent, adult child, adult
sibling, guardian, or a committee of the person which is authorized to consent to research.
See id. at §527.10(e)(2)(iv).
157. See id. § 527.10(e)(2)(i).
158. See id. § 527.10(d)(6).
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produce knowledge that has therapeutic importance for the understanding or
treatment of a condition that is present in the patient. 59
The requirement of therapeutic benefit could be waived if the IRB
determined that the research would have a direct benefit that is important to
the general health or well-being of the patient and was available only in the
context of research.16 ° If the research involved more than a minimal risk,
certain information about the experiment must have been provided to the
patient or the representative.1 61 If the person was incapable of providing
consent, consent could be obtained from an individual appointed pursuant to
a duly executed durable power of attorney specifying the authority to consent
to participation in research, 162 or specifying that an individual be appointed
by the patient to consent or withhold consent.'63 If the patient lacked
capacity to consent and had not designated anyone with this power, consent
could be obtained from a patient's legally authorized representative.1 64 If
there was no legally authorized representative, then consent could come from
a close friend,1 65 or from a court which finds that there is a direct benefit from
the research.1 66 Finally, no patient would become or remain a research
subject over the objection of the patient or the people authorized to represent
him.'67 Any objection would be honored unless an independent psychiatrist




160. See id. § 527.10(d)(7).
161. See id. § 527.10(e)(1)(ii)(a)-(h).
162. See id. § 527.10(e)(2)(iii)(a).
163. See id. § 527.10(e)(2)(iii)(b).
164. See id. § 527.1O(e)(2)(iv).
165. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10(c)(3) (1990). Close friend is
defined as:
"[A]n adult who presents an affidavit to the director which states that he is
a close friend of the patient and that he has maintained such regular contact
with the patient to be familiar with the patient's activities, health, and
religious or moral beliefs and stating the facts and circumstances that
demonstrate such familiarity."
Id.
166. Cf Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337 (N.Y. 1986) (stating that if a mental patient
refuses to take medication there needs to be a judicial hearing to decide if the patient has the
capacity to make reasoned decisions with respect to treatment, since the right to refuse
treatment is not absolute and may yield to compelling state interests, such as in situations
where the patient is a danger to himself or others).
167. See N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 14, § 527.10(d)(2); id. § 527.10(e)(2)(vii).
168. See id. § 527.10(e)(2)(viii).
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These regulations, however, were short-lived. In TD v. New York State
Office of Mental Health,169 the trial court held that the regulations were
inconsistent with the New York Public Health Law because they were
promulgated under the Office of Mental Health instead of the Commissioner
of Health, who actually has the right to consent to research involving the
incompetent. 170 The appellate court agreed with this finding, 17' and also held
that the regulations violated the constitutional rights of the mentally disabled
patient under both the New York Constitution'72 and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.173 The appellate court stated
that the experiments being performed provided no or minimal benefit and
involved more than a minimal risk: '74
[T]he well being of potential subjects ... must ... be the
overriding concern in the research context and should be the focus
169. 626 N.Y.S.2d 1015 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995), aff'd 650 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div.
1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted by 684
N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997).
170. See T.D., 626 N.Y.S.2d at 1022 ("[T]he court declares that the OMH regulations for
the conduct of human subject research were promulgated by the Commissioner of OMH
beyond his authority and are thus invalid."); see also N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2444(2)
(McKinney 1985) (stating that where the subject is an incompetent or a mentally disabled
person, the consent of the patient, the human research review committee, and the
Commissioner of Health is required).
171. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 176 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted
by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997) ("[W]e agree with the hearing court that the Commissioner
of the OMH lacked the authority to promulgate the challenged regulations governing human
subject research....")
172. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law.").
173. See T.D., 650 N.Y.S.2d at 176 ("[W]e conclude that the challenged regulations do not
adequately safeguard and therefore violate the State and Federal constitutional rights to due
process, as well as the common-law right to personal autonomy, of the patients... who are,
or potentially may be, subjects for the experimentation at issue."). The court stated that they
would include a constitutional analysis of the New York regulations because it was likely that
the Commissioner of Health would issue new regulations covering the experimental research
of incompetents incapable of providing consent, since they struck down the regulations by
the Office of Mental Health. See id. at 185. The Fourteenth Amendment states that a state
cannot deprive "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
174. See T.D., 650 N.Y.S. 2d at 185 ("[The experiments] expose the subjects to . ..
invasive and painful procedures and/or the administration of psychotropic drugs,
antipsychotic drugs and other medications, which have harmful side effects as severe or even
worse than similar medications and procedures currently used for treatment.").
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of... protocols and practices in assessing capacity and obtaining
informed consent from capable individuals and/or from properly
designated surrogates of individuals found to lack the capacity to
give or withhold consent. 175
The court held that the potential subject needed to be given adequate
notice that his or her capacity was being evaluated. 76 They found a lack of
requirement for notice to the patient or to the representative when the patient
objects to continuation in the experiment and then is overridden by a
psychiatrist and the court and, therefore, there was no opportunity for
administrative orjudicial review of the psychiatrists' opinion. 77 In addition,
the psychiatrist could overrule the patient's decision if there will be a direct
benefit, but the nature of the benefit is undefined. 78 Therefore, while the
benefit had to be important to the health or well-being of the patient, it was
not required to be a product of the research procedures or related to the
condition from which the patient suffers. 79 The regulations also did not
identify or set out any qualifications for the individual who initially assessed
a patient's capacity. In addition, the individuals who may act as a surrogate
were found to be unacceptable. 8 ' Many of the people who could act as
surrogates do not have to be appointed as a guardian nor are they guaranteed
to act in the patient's best interest.' 8' The court also found alarming the
option provided to researchers to experiment on incompetent persons when
the benefit was for general health. 8 2 Although the court struck down the
regulations, the decision provides guidance as to the minimum protections
needed in order to meet the constitutional standard: "at the very least,
[regulations need to] contain appropriate and specific provisions for notice
to the potential subject that his or her capacity is being evaluated and for
175. Id.
176. See id. at 187, 189 (stating that, "at the very least," that adequate notice of a capacity
inquiry and judicial review of the capacity finding is necessary for the regulations to be
constitutional).
177. See id. at 193.
178. See id.
179. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 193 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted
by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997).
180. See T.D. v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 650 N.Y.S.2d 173, 190 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1996), appeal dismissed by 680 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 1997), leave to appeal granted
by 684 N.E.2d 281 (N.Y. 1997).
181. See id.
182. Seeid. at 188.
2000]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
appropriate administrative and [a process for] judicial review of a
determination regarding capacity." 1
83
The lack of concrete statutory authority will lead researchers who want
to perform medical experiments on incompetent persons to seek approval
from the courts by means of the appointment of a guardian who would have
the legal power to make decisions on behalf of the mentally retarded
patient.'84 A court in Michigan held that experimental treatments could not
be performed on a mentally incompetent person even if a surrogate decision-
maker who is not a guardian consented.'85 This would be consistent with the
parens patriae role of states in protecting incompetent individuals and




The mentally retarded maintain the right to consent to medical
treatment, 87 but the informed consent of the patient, or someone authorized
to act on their behalf, must be obtained before the patient can undergo
surgery.188 In cases where the patient is placed in a facility or hospital, "[t]he
183. See id. at 187.
[I]t is possible that, under [these] regulations, an otherwise capable person
may be determined to be incapable for defendants' purposes because he or
she is found to lack the ability to understand and make a decision about
whether or not to participate in a particular study. In that event, neither the
determination of lack of capacity itself nor the decisions of the surrogate
are reviewable at the patient's request. Indeed, given the lack of notice
requirement, the patient may not even be informed of either determination
and may not even be aware he or she is involved in research. Therefore, we
hold that the provisions for determining a potential subject's capacity under
the challenged regulations fail to adequately protect the individual's due
process rights guaranteed under both the New York State and United States
Constitutions and declare them unconstitutional for that reason.
Id. at 190.
184. See Hoffman & Schwartz, supra note 121, at 128.
185. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health, 1 MENTAL DISABILITY L.
REP. 147 (1976).
186. See Hoffman & Schwartz, supra note 122, at 128.
187. See Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 427
(Mass. 1977).
188. See Hanes v. Ambrose, 437 N.Y.S.2d 784, 785 (3d Dep't 1981) (holding that a
woman refusing to consent to surgery to cure an abscess from a past surgery was capable of
giving consent even though experts were not sure if she understood the severity of her
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fact that the patient is involuntarily retained is not presumptive of
incompetence or a lack of mental capacity to knowingly consent or withhold
consent. . 189 If the patient refuses to give consent, it is determinative
unless the state convincingly demonstrates that the patient lacks the mental
capacity to consent.190
If the person cannot understand the severity of the condition or the
surgery, or provide informed consent, the state has to care for and protect the
best interest of the incompetent person under the doctrine of parens
patriae."9 ' When the state exercises itsparenspatriae powers, the state must
act in the best interests of the mentally retarded person.192 This standard is
used to ensure that the rights of the mentally retarded to accept or refuse
medical treatment are protected to the same extent as a competent person.
193
In considering what is in the best interest of an incompetent person, the
courts do not consider how a competent would respond if in a similar
situation.'94 In essence, the state cannot impose the consensus ofthe majority
in determining whether to impose the medical treatment upon an incompetent
person: Individual choice is determined not by the vote of the majority but
by the complexities of the singular situation viewed from the unique
perspective of the person called on to make the decision. To presume that
the incompetent person must always be subjected to what many rational and
intelligent persons may decline is to downgrade the status of the incompetent
condition). The court decided that:
[G]iven the non-emergency character of her condition, the absence of pain
or discomfort associated with it, her age, her very real fear she would be
unable to survive another operation, and petitioner's admission that, barring
complications, she could continue to live a good many years without the
operation, it is our view that the State did not carry the burden of proving
that she was incapable of consenting. Id.
189. Id. (citing N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.03).
190. See id. (citing New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 335 N.Y. S.2d 461 (Sup.
Ct. 1981); see also New York City Health & Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 335 N.Y.S.2d 461, 465
(Sup. Ct. 1981) (stating that the "respondent does have the mental capacity to know and
understand whether she wishes to consent to electroshock therapy. It does not matter whether
this Court would agree with the judgment; it is enough that she is capable of making a
decision, however unfortunate that decision may prove to be.").
191. See Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 427.
192. See id. at 427.
193. See id. at 427 (recognizing that the right to refuse medical treatment "must extend to
the case of an incompetent, as well as a competent, patient because the value of human
dignity extends to both.").
194. See id. at 428.
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person by placing a lesser value on his intrinsic human worth and vitality.195
The court has to determine with as much accuracy as possible the wishes and
needs of the individual involved.'96 A court uses substituted judgment in
order to act in the best interest of a mentally retarded patient 97 In applying
substituted judgment, the court imposes the decision that the incompetent
person would make, were the person competent, taking into account future
competency.198 This standard is used even though the patient has been
retarded his entire life.199
The doctrine of substituted judgment was used in Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz.2 °° Saikewicz was a profoundly retarded
man suffering from acute leukemia. 20 ' Due to his retardation, Saikewicz did
not have capacity to give informed consent for the needed treatment.2 °2 He
was incapable of understanding his disease, disoriented when outside of his
usual environment, and incapable of communicating if he was in pain.23 In
addition, besides having harsh side effects with chemotherapy, Saikewicz's
chance of remission were only thirty to fifty percent.2°4
The court stated that the fact that most people would choose
chemotherapy was not sufficient evidence that Saikewicz would come to the
same conclusion since he did not understand his condition or prognosis20 5
The patient's age of sixty-seven,2 °6 along with the side effects of the
treatments, the low chance for recovery, and the patient's inability to
cooperate with treatment were unique to Saikewicz, and were found to be
vital components of the substitute judgment analysis.20 7 The court held that
195. See id.
196. See id. at 430.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 431; see also Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S.
261, 286-87 (1990); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 494, 497 (Tx. 1979).
199. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,430-
31 (Mass. 1977).
200. See id.
201. See id. at 418, 420 (stating that Saikewicz possessed an IQ of 10 and a mental age of
approximately two years of age).
202. See id. at 419.
203. See id. at 420.
204. See id.
205. See id. at 430.
206. See id. at 420.
207. See id. at 431.
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withholding treatment was in his interest since it would ensure his comfort
for the remainder of his life.2 °8
The substituted judgment doctrine was not accepted by the Supreme
Court in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dept. of Health.209 The Court stated
that courts can use the wishes of an incompetent person if expressed during
a period when they were competent, if such were shown through clear and
convincing evidence.210  The Supreme Court rejected the use of the
substituted judgment of the family, since the family was not a disinterested
party and may not focus purely on the best interest of the patient, and ruled
that the right of refusal may have to be exercised by a surrogate. 21 1 The state
only has to consider the wishes of the patient.21 2
Substituted judgment has also been used in cases where the mentally
disabled person is an organ donor.21 3 In such cases, substituted judgment
requires consideration of whether or not the transplant benefits the mentally
disabled person, not whether the person would consent if competent.1 4 In
Little v. Little,215 the court allowed a mother to authorize the transplant of her
mentally retarded daughter's kidney to her son who had renal disease.21 6 The
court found that it was beneficial for the patient to donate her kidney because
her brother's death might be psychologically detrimental2 7 and she would
suffer limited pain from the operation.218
208. See id. at 432.
209. 497 U.S. 261 (1990). In Cruzan, the Court was determining whether or not to
disconnect the feeding and hydration tube from an incompetent person. See id. at 266.
Cruzan suffered from permanent brain damage, but had not been mentally retarded her entire
life. See id.
210. See id. at 284.
211. See id. at 286.
212. See id. at 286-87
213. See Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1979).
214. See id. at 498.
215. 576 S.W.2d 493 (Tex. Civ. App. San Antonio 1979).
216. See id. at 494.
217. See id. at 499.
218. See id.
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F. Voluntary Commitment
The idea of voluntary commitment for the mentally disabled or the
mentally ill is an almost extinct concept in its literal form. Mentally disabled
persons cannot check themselves into a mental facility without a competency
hearing first.219 Although there are few cases about the capacity to consent
for voluntary commitment of the mentally disabled, Zinermon v. Burch is a
case concerning the difficulties of consent for the mentally ill.22° In
Zinermon, the mentally ill patient was "hallucinating," "confused," and
"believed that he was 'in heaven."' 2   The staff diagnosed the patient as
having "paranoid schizophrenia and gave him psychotropic medication. 222
A few days later the patient signed forms admitting himself to a mental
hospital.223 After his subsequent release, the patient asserted that he was not
properly admitted and that he did not remember signing the voluntary
admission forms.224 This case was decided under Florida law where hospitals
can admit patients voluntarily if the patient makes the "application by
express and informed consent.
22 5
The standard for competency is whether the patient was capable "of
voluntary, knowing, understanding and informed consent to admission and
treatment., 226 The Supreme Court stated that the hospital admitted the
patient even though it should have known the patient was incapable of
informed consent, and that he was held without a hearing, a violation of his
due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.227 The court further
stated that "without a hearing or any other procedure to determine either that
he validly had consented to admission, or that he met the statutory standard
219. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990) (finding that a mentally ill patient
who voluntarily admitted himself to a mental hospital was deprived of his procedural due
process rights because there was no hearing to determine whether he was competent to
commit himself).
220. See id.
221. See id. at 118.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 118-19.
224. See id. at 120.
225. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. at 123 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.465(1)(a)
(1981)). "Express and informed consent" is defined as A consent voluntarily given in writing
after sufficient explanation and disclosure.., to enable the person.., to make a knowing and
willful decision without any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, or other form of
constraint or coercion." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.455(22) (1981)).
226. See id. at 122.
227. See id. at 121.
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for involuntary placement, [there is a] clear infringement on his liberty
interest. '228 The court does recognize in a footnote that if the patient was
competent to consent there would be no deprivation of his liberty. 229 The
Supreme Court stated that there needs to be a process to determine whether
a patient is competent:
[O]nly a person competent to give informed consent may be
admitted as a voluntary patient. There is, however, no
specified way of determining [under Florida law], before a
patient is asked to sign admission forms, whether he is
competent. It is hardly unforeseeable that a person
requesting treatment for mental illness might be incapable of
informed consent, and that state officials with the power to
admit patients might take their apparent willingness to be
admitted at face value and not initiate involuntary placement
procedures.23 °
G. Sex Acts
A mentally disabled person is deemed to be unable to consent to sexual
acts if the person, due to their mental retardation, is unable to provide
"intelligent assent or dissent or of exercising judgment, '2 3' and if they are
incapable of understanding the nature or consequences of the act of sexual
intercourse.232 If consent is verbally obtained from a mentally retarded
person, a partner can still be convicted of rape, even though consent would
ordinarily negate the element of force.233
228. See id. at 131.
229. See id. at 131 n.17.
230. See id. at 136.
231. Baise v. State, 232 Ga. App. 556, 558, 502 S.E2d 492, 495 (1998). See also Durr
v. State, 493 S.E.2d 210, 212 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (providing the standard of "knowing and
intelligent consent to the alleged sexual act"); In re Sechler, No. 96-T-5575, 1997 WL
585928, at *4 (Ohio App. Ct. Aug. 29, 1997); Ely v. State, 384 S.E.2d 268,271 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989).
232. See State v. Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 235, 237 (Wash. 1994).
233. Baise, 232 Ga. App. at 558 ("[I]n a forcible rape case where the victim indicates
consent and does not resist, but by reason of mental retardation she is incapable of
intelligently consenting, the lack of actual force necessary to overcome a resistant victim in
other cases is supplied constructively by the rule that no more force need be used than that
necessary to effect the penetration made by the defendant."); see also Durr v. State, 493
S.E.2d 210, 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
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In the ordinary case the force to which reference is made is not the force
inherent in the act of penetration but is the force used to overcome the
resistance of the female. When the victim is physically or mentally unable
to give consent to the act, as when she is intoxicated, drugged, or mentally
incompetent, the requirement of force is found in constructive force, that is,
in the use of such force as is necessary to effect the penetration made by the
defendant.234 A defendant can also be convicted of rape if the defendant
knows that the person is incapable of consent due to her mental condition,
even if the mentally retarded person submits to the sexual act.235
In deciding whether a mentally disabled person has the capacity to
consent, the standard of intelligent and knowing consent has been adopted in
most states, even though it may be termed differently. A mentally disabled
individual is unable to give consent when there is a lack of understanding.236
The question is "whether a person possesses sufficient
resources-intellectual, emotional, social, psychological-to determine
whether to participate in sexual contact with another" and is determined by
the jury evaluating the "victim's ability to function in society., 23 7 These
statutes cannot be interpreted to prohibit all retarded individuals from
engaging in consensual sex238 and, therefore, each case must be analyzed on
a case-by-case basis. Although most states have this standard, there are two
different interpretations.239 To "know, apprehend, or appreciate" the "nature
and consequences" of sexual intercourse can range from a simple
understanding of how the act of coitus is physically accomplished together
with an understanding that a sensation of pleasure may accompany the act,
to a thorough and comprehensive understanding of the complex
psychological and physiological "nature" of "the sexual act involved" and
234. Durr v. State, 493 S.E.2d 210, 211 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
235. See id.; see also Doe v. Shaffer, Nos. A-9304212, C-970057, 1998 WL 140042, at
*2 (Ohio Ct. App. March 27, 1998) (stating that the defendant knew of the severe mental
retardation of the victim, and therefore there was no consent). "[T]he deliberate preying upon
[of] 'innocent and vulnerable victims' who are incapable of consenting to sexual contact is
so reprehensible as to preclude liability coverage for injuries resulting from these intentional
acts of sexual molestation." Id. (citing Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115,
1118-19 (1996).
236. See People v. Cratsley, 86 N.Y.2d 81, 87, 653 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. Ct. App.
1995).
237. Id.




that, aside from immediate gratification, the act may have dire familial,
social, medical, physical, economic or spiritual consequences.
240
Some jurisdictions require evidence that the retarded victim was
incapable of understanding the "distinctively sexual nature of the conduct.
2 41
These states hold that the range of mental functioning among mentally
disabled persons varies and therefore it is not fair to punish the sexual
partners of these individuals who have a rudimentary understanding of the act
and are capable of making a volitional choice to engage or not engage in such
conduct.242  "Persons are mentally defective .. .only if incapable of
understanding the nature of their conduct, i.e., that they are engaged in sexual
activity. ' '241 If a person is mentally incapacitated but understands the nature
and consequences of intercourse, "which understanding includes the capacity
to make a volitional choice to engage or not engage in such act," then the
mentally disabled person has the capacity to consent even if the decision is
* 244unwise.
Other jurisdictions require that the state show that the victim was
incapable of understanding not only the sexual nature of the act but also "the
physiological, social, and moral ramifications of his or her actions., 245 An
understanding of coitus encompasses more than a knowledge of its
physiological nature. An appreciation of how it will be regarded in the
framework of the societal environment and taboos to which a person will be
exposed may be far more important. 246 These other jurisdictions hold that it
is necessary to show more than a superficial understanding of the act of
sexual intercourse in order to demonstrate that a mentally disabled individual
240. Id. at 388.
241. See id. at 387; see also State v. Olivio, 568 A.2d 1II (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1989).
242. See id. at 388.
243. State v. Olivio, 568 A.2d 111, 112 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (acknowledging
that the earlier standard called for an understanding of the sexual conduct including whether
the behavior was morally right or wrong).
244. Id. at 388-89.
245. Id. See also People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1332 (N.Y. 1977); People v.
McMullen, 414 N.E.2d 214, 217 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980); State v. Soura, 796 P.2d 109 (Idaho
1990); Bozarth v. State, 520 N.E.2d 460, 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) ("[T]he capacity to
consent presupposes an intelligence capable of understanding the act, its nature, and possible
consequences." (citing Stafford v. State, 455 N.E.2d 402 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)); State v.
Sloan, 481 P.2d 646, 647 (Or. Ct. App. 1971) ("Legal consent.., presupposes an intelligence
capable of understanding the act, its nature and possible consequences. Such intelligence
may exist with an impaired or feeble intellect or it may not.").
246. State v. Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 237 (Wash. 1994) (citing People v. Easley,
364 N.E.2d 1328 (1977)).
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has the capacity to consent.247 In order to have a meaningful understanding
of sex, it is necessary to appreciate many ramifications: emotional intimacy
between partners, pregnancy, possible disease, and death.248 It is not
necessary to understand all of these concepts in order to establish that the
mentally retarded person had the capacity to consent, but they are elements
used to determine whether the person had a meaningful understanding of the
nature and consequences of sexual intercourse. 249  This appraisal also
encompasses an inquiry into the moral quality of the act--"the nature of the
stigma, the ostracism or other noncriminal sanctions which society levies for
conduct it labels only as immoral., 25" Therefore, a basic understanding of the
mechanics of sexual intercourse alone is not equated with the understanding
of the nature and consequences of sex.25'
One court found that a mentally retarded girl who may have the ability
to understand the concept of sex was not prepared for the consequences of
sexual activity since she had been so sheltered throughout her life.252 Since
she did not have the information concerning the consequences of sex, she
could not make an informed decision.253 The fact finder cannot infer from
proof of general mental ... retardation or an IQ range or mental age that a
victim is prevented or unable to understand the nature and consequences of
a sexual act, unless the evidence proves that the victim lacks the ability to
comprehend or appreciate either the distinguishing characteristics or physical
qualities of the sexual act or the future natural behavioral or societal results
of effects which may flow from the sexual act.254
Capacity cannot be implied by the fact that the mentally retarded person
had prior sexual encounters with others.255 In Commonwealth v. Thomson,256
a mentally retarded patient who was impregnated by another person was held
247. See State v. Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Wash. 1994) (citing RCW
9A.44.010(4)).
248. See id. at 237.
249. See id.
250. People v. Easley, 364 N.E.2d 1328, 1332-33 (NY 1977).
251. See id. (citing State v. Summers, 853 P.2d 953 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993), review denied,
866 P.2d 40 (Wash. 1993)).
252. See In the Matter of Sechler, No. 96-T-5575, 1997 WL 585928, at 4 (Ohio App. 11
Dist. Ct.).
253. See id.
254. White v. Commonwealth, 478 S.E.2d 713, 715 (Va. Ct. App. 1996).
255. See Commonwealth v. Thomson, 673 A.2d 357 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that the
new evidence of the victim's pregnancy was not sufficient to prove that the victim consented




not to be capable of consent.257 Consent is not necessary to become pregnant,
nor does the pregnancy prove that the person can give consent. 258 "A person
is able to become pregnant without having the capacity to give consent to
sexual intercourse .... The fact that the victim had sexual intercourse with
another individual does not render her capable of giving consent during that
encounter nor during the encounter with appellant.,
259
II. JEWISH LAW
Jewish law distinguishes itself in its dealings with the mentally
disabled in two fundamental ways. First, in determining the care for an
individual who is mentally disabled, Halacha does not technically recognize
a formal transfer of decision-making power to another individual. This
remains true regardless of whether the guardian would be a friend or relative,
or even the court itself. This derives primarily from Jewish law's
understanding that human beings are not property and thus, cannot be owned
by another or, for that matter, even by the individual himself. Rather, each
individual is responsible for living his or her life in accord with a higher ideal
as defined by God through the halachic system. This responsibility does not
remain an individual one, but expands into a communal one as well. "Kol
yisrael arevim ze lazeh," or "each individual is bound to the other" places
upon each Jewish individual the responsibility to support his peer in the
attempt to live in accordance with this higher ideal. Therefore, intervention
on behalf of the mentally disabled individual is not so much a transfer of
power as an intensification of a previously existing responsibility of one
towards the other. As such, the incompetent individual will maintain her
independence and any decisions will be rendered using solely best-interest
criteria, as we will see below.
Second, whereas United States law appears to employ a binary
approach to establishing the competence of individuals, Halacha employs a
multi-tiered matrix to establishing the status of the individual. In United
States law, it is necessary to establish the comprehension and competence of
the individual. Once it is determined that the individual is indeed unable to
make the necessary decisions to provide for himself, he is declared
incompetent. One could say that "competent decision-making" and "lack of
capacity" (to decide) are mutually exclusive terms. Halacha certainly uses
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mental competence as the criterion for declaring an individual a shoteh
(mentally incompetent).and, as a result of such a decision, will render the
individual absolved from the responsibility of fulfilling mitzvot. However,
Jewish law's definition of da 'at, or the ability to consent in a legally binding
manner, does not necessarily depend on the same criteria as declaring an
individual a shoteh. As such, an individual may be declared a shoteh, or
incompetent, and still be capable of consenting to a business deal or of
divorcing his wife.
The all-encompassing nature of the Jewish person's commitment to
Halacha creates a circumstance where we will find that an individual will be
declared incompetent more easily in Jewish law than in general law. The
Halachic system places demands on every aspect of the person's life. The
Rabbis determined, then, that where this was not a reasonable expectation,
the person is not obligated, although certainly encouraged to participate, in
Jewish ritual observance. However, the individual, as we will see, still
maintains independence and responsibility. Therefore, we will find that an
individual might be deemed mentally incompetent in one particular area
alone and continue to maintain his independence in other areas. There is a
clear compartmentalization of categories which is characteristic of the way
Halacha deals with mental incompetence. We will clarify some of the
discussion as to the decision-making capacity of various types of individuals
below.
We will begin by comparing the custodial categories defined in
United States law with those categories as set forth in Halacha. We will then
show how Halacha defines the mentally incompetent individual, followed by
a discussion of the requirements of consent in the Jewish legal system.
Finally, we will compare some of the specific examples mentioned above
with similar situations as seen from within the Halachic framework.
A. Definition of Terms
The halachic term for a mentally dysfunctional individual is a shoteh.
The Talmud briefly describes the shoteh using three examples: "Who is
defined as a shoteh? One who steps out alone at night, one who rests in a
cemetery and one who rips his clothing. 2 60 A second beraita adds: "One
who loses what is given to him.
2 61
260. See Tosefta Terumot 3:1; Hagiga 3b.
261. See Hagiga 4a.
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The interpretive challenge in reading this Tannaitic statement is to
determine the scope of these "signs" in ascribing the status of shoteh to a
particular individual. It is clear that one need not display these specific
attributes to be declared incompetent. An individual who, through thorough
lack of understanding and incompetent decision-making, can be judged by
a court to be a shoteh gamur, or completely incompetent, need not display
these particular symptoms. 2 62 Rather, as we have mentioned above, Halacha
will categorize someone as mentally incompetent even if it is not completely
pervasive in the individual's personality. These statements attempt to define
incompetence even should it not be entirely pervasive but, rather,
compartmentalized. For example, R. Moshe Feinstein describes an
individual who thought he was the Messiah and as such exhibited odd
behavior. At times, he would climb trees and preach to passers by, or
demand as the Messiah to lead services or read from the Torah in synagogue.
At times, he even resorted to grabbing the Torah in synagogue and walking
away with it, or walking naked through the streets. This behavior clearly
exhibited serious discord with his surroundings. In other matters, however,
he was lucid and showed proper understanding of his surroundings.263 In
such a circumstance, the Talmudic categories become useful in determining
whether such an individual is declared incompetent according to Halacha.
Amoraim debated whether one should be deemed ashoteh, provided
one exhibited all three aberrant behaviors described in the Beraita (Rav
Huna), or any one of these practices would qualify the individual as a shoteh
(Rav Yochanan). Both opinions agree on the need for the individual to
display aberrant behavior on a regular basis. Their disagreement revolves
around the need to show the penetration of such behavior into the total
personality, or a singular behavior recurring a number of times would also
warrant declaring the person a shoteh.264 Halacha states that even one such
characteristic can establish the person as a shoteh, in accordance with the
opinion of Rav Yochanan.265
What remained unclear, however, was the scope of these examples.
Since the legal code specified these particular examples, R. Simcha of
Speyer266 and R. Avigdor Katz267 suggested that only these symptoms define
262. See Divrei Hayyim, Responsa 53.
263. See Igrot Moshe, E"H 120.
264. KesefMishnah, Hil. Eidut 9:9, quoted in Shach Y.D 1:23. See also Tevuot Shor Y:D
1:46.
265. Rosh to Hullin 1:4, Y.D 1:5.
266. See Teshuvot Maharam Ben Barukh, 455.
267. See Maharik, Responsum 19.
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one as mentally incompetent in circumstances where all other behaviors
seem intact. Following this theory, the man who thought he was Messiah
would not be considered a shoteh, being that he did not exhibit the particular
characteristics defined in the Talmud. Rambam, however, disagrees:
The shoteh is an invalid witness being that he is not obligated
in Mitzvot. Not just the shoteh who walks naked, breaks dishes, and
throws stones, rather anyone whose mental capacity has left him
and is found to be confused in a particular matter on a regular basis,
although he speaks and responds to the point in all other matters, he
is invalid, and considered in the category of shotim.268
Rambam clearly states that the categories described in the Talmud
are not exhaustive. Any characteristics that reflect the appropriate degree of
incompetence as determined by a knowledgeable authority would be
considered a shoteh. The Rambam must answer for the need for the
particular examples in the Talmud. If, in fact, there are other comparable
behaviors, why create this insufficient list? R. Hayyim Soloveichik
suggested that the Talmud, here, generated broad categories of mental
dysfunction as reflected in the specific examples. An individual who places
himself in the company of the dead, or who is willing to place himself in
danger by traveling alone at night, is portraying depressive behavior. One
who tears his clothing indiscriminately is an example of manic behavior. In
other words, the Talmud uses examples to suggest broad categories into
which many other contemporary examples could be included as well.269
Following Rambam, we may assume that the man who thought he
was Messiah, could be deemed mentally incompetent. There remain two
ways to understand the grounding of such a declaration. The language of the
Rambam ("considered in the category of shotim") suggests that it is fair to
assume that the disability influences other areas beyond the particular
manifestation and, as such, the individual's decision-making capacity is
thoroughly impaired. 27" Tosfot, however, presents the matter differently:
"since he is a shoteh in one [category], it is certainly correct to assume
(lehakhaziko) him a shoteh in all matters. ' 271 The implication in the words
of Tosfot is that we need assume that the person is a shoteh. If, however, it
268. See Rambam, Hilkhot Eidut 9:9.
269. Quoted in R. Yechezkel Abramsky, OTzAR HAPOSKIM, VOL. 2, endnotes, p.22.
270. See Sm"aH.M. 35:21.
271. Hagiga 3b, s.v. derech.
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was verifiable that the person is lucid in a particular matter, we could in fact
separate the issues and declare the person shoteh in specific circumstances
and competent in others. We will return to this debate later.
Having briefly defined the category, we can begin to discuss the
practical issues of caring for the mentally disabled. Given that the individual
is in need of supportive care and aid in the decision-making processes of life,
what role do friends, relatives, and the government play in this situation? We
will be concerned with the conceptual grounding as well as the practical
allowances for intervention by various individuals in the care of the
individual.
B. Custodial Categories
We have seen that United States law balances between four variables,
depending on the particular state, to transfer the right of decision to a
competent second party when the mentally disabled person is deemed unable
to consent: 1) parens patriae, or the "parental" right of the state to limit the
powers of the individual; 2) relatives or a guardian exercising the right of
decision on the person's behalf; 3) substitution, or the attempt to assess the
wishes and preferences of the person and decide based on what the person
would have decided ; 2" and 4) the best interest principle which would assess
the best interest of the individual regardless of the preference of the person
herself or the relative or guardian. Judaism places the freedom to choose at
the center of its value system, essentially as the manifestation of the human
being as tzelem elokim, created in the image of God. Can Halacha recognize
the transfer of the power of decision to another at all?
C. Parens Patriae
The freedom of the human being is deemed an inalienable right
according to Jewish law. Each person is considered master of his or her own
destiny, thus protecting his or her decision-making capacity. This principle
is a foundational element in biblical law. Immediately following the
272. This decision would, of course, be assessed by either the court, parent, or guardian,
but nonetheless should be distinguished from the above to the degree that options 1) and 2)
could simply reflect the right or power of the court, relative, or guardian to decide. That
natural or granted right to decide should be distinguished from the category of substitution
or of the best interests principle which simply declares the state, relative, or guardian wise
enough to make the decision on the person's behalf.
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revelation on Mount Sinai, God secures this right by declaring the unique
value of the human being and legally distinguishing her from property,
unable to be treated as possession. In the Ancient Near East, people did have
the status of property. The code of Hammurabi contains a number of such
cases. For example, if a worker errs and the roof of his client's house falls
on the son of the homeowner, the punishment for the worker is the death of
his son.273 This law reflects the treatment of each human being as possessing
comparable value, and the Jewish community had difficulty adjusting to this
new value system. Scripture describes people being taken as collateral on
loans, to the dismay of the prophets and leaders of the day.274 The Book of
the Covenant 275 takes issue with this value system in four separate areas: 1.)
Criminal Law-The Torah demands capital punishment for a murderer and
prohibits a monetary payment in such a situation;2 76 2.) Loans-The Torah
prohibits taking human beings as payment or collateral for loans even in a
working capacity;277 3.) Slavery-Jewish law prohibits the purchase and sale
of another Jew. This is a result of the impossibility of ownership of another
Jew. The Torah allows for the hire of a worker alone;278 and 4.)
Parenthood-Biblical law emphasizes that children are not considered the
property of their parents.279
Biblical belief in the human being as a Tzelem Elokim demands that
the uniqueness of each individual be placed at the forefront of its value
system. This guarantees the independence of the individual over and against
the interest of parents, relatives, or the government in matters that are of
273. See Code of Hammurabi, pars. 116, 210, 230.
274. See Kings II, 4:1-2; Nehemiah 5:1-12.
275. Exodus 21-23.
276. Exodus 21:12, 28-30; Genesis 9:5-6; Numbers 35:31-32; see also the remarks of
Moshe Greenberg, SOME POSTULATES OF BIBLICAL CRIMINAL LAW IN IDEM, STUDIES IN THE
BIBLE AND JEWISH THOUGHT, JEWISH PUBLICATION SOCIETY 30-34 (1995).
277. See Exodus 22:24-26; Deuteronomy 24:10-13; Nehemiah 5:1-12;Menachem Elon,
Freedom of the Individual in Debt Collection in Jewish Law (Hebrew), Jerusalem, 1964.
278. See Exodus 21:2-11; Leviticus 25:39-44.
279. See Exodus 21:31. In the case of the goring ox of a negligent owner which results in
the death of the victim, the law declares the guilt of the owner and demands the death penalty
as in other cases of murder. In this case alone, as a result of the indirect involvement of the
owner, the law permits a monetary payment (kofer) in lieu of capital punishment. Verse 31
emphasizes that the law is the same regardless of whether the victim is an adult or a minor.
The need for such an emphasis lies in the contrast of this law with the prevailing
understanding as depicted, for example, in the Code of Hammurabi. In the Code, a worker
whose negligence results in the death of the child of the homeowner, is subject to the loss of
his own son as punishment. Biblical law, in turn, emphasizes the unique human quality of
each person, whether adult or child, and, as such bothers to clarify the concept in this verse.
[Vol. 20
CAPACITY TO CONSENT
purely personal consequence to the individual. As such, the concept of
parenspatriae is one that is foreign to the halachic system. This is not to say
that the state may never interfere in the decision-making process of the
individual. It will, however, limit both the rationale for interference, as well
as the degree to which the state may interfere.
There are essentially two categories that permit the interference of
others into the life of an individual: 1) where the actions of the individual
create a danger for the surrounding community; or 2) where the actions of the
individual endanger the individual himself. Each of these categories, in turn,
has two components.
D. Endangering Others
Where there is concern that the mentally disabled person might
endanger the life of another person, Halacha grants the right, and even the
obligation, to interfere, as is true regarding mentally healthy individuals as
well. Standing idly by while another person is endangered by natural or
human force is considered a crime of omission.28" The aggressor in such a
situation is considered a rodef and must be stopped. This is true despite the
absence of a conscious decision to harm another.28' If the mentally
handicapped person is deemed dangerous to those around him, it is the
responsibility of the community to intervene.
If an individual causes damage to the property of another, and
certainly physical harm to another person (albeit without the fear of fatal
results), it is the right of the victim to protect her property or herself-even
resorting to violence, provided it is the minimal violence necessary. Rosh
absolves the victim of any damage suffered by the aggressor as a result of the
subsequent exchange.282 Prevention of such damage is cause for limiting the
powers of a mentally disabled person.283
280. See Leviticus 19:17; Rashi ad loc., Sanhedrin 73a.
281. See Sanhedrin 72b (regarding a foetus); cf Maimonides, Hilchot Rotzeach 1:9,
Hiddushei R. Hayyim Halevi ad loc.
282. See Mishna, B.K. 33a; Rosh ad loc. 3:13.
283. As to the anticipatory nature of this interference (as opposed to the above-mentioned
texts where the perpetrator is already involved in the act), see the comments of Magid
Mishnah, Hilkhot Shabbat 2:14 where he justifies hillul shabbat on such anticipatory
grounds. This interpretation of the Magid Mishna differs from that of R. Elchanan
Wasserman in Kovetz He'arot 18:5 and R. Ovadia Yosef in Yechave Da 'at, Vol. 4:30. See
R. Moshe Mordechai Farbshtein, Mishptei Da 'at, at 199-200.
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E. Personal Welfare
If a person can not or does not provide for his or her own physical
well-being, thereby causing danger to him or herself, the community is
obligated to intervene. The degree to which there is autonomy in medical
decision-making has been debated of late.284 Nevertheless, it maybe safely
stated that any medical procedure which is considered to grant basic
sustenance, such as food and oxygen, or a more complex procedure that is
statistically shown to succeed, may, in most cases, be administered without
the formal consent of the individual.285 A person is obligated to prevent the
financial loss of his friend. The obligation of Hashavat Aveida demands that
a person invest the time and, if necessary, provide financial resources to save
a friend from loss. This is not dependent on the consent of the individual and
is automatically assumed to be to the benefit of the individual.
In the spiritual realm, this communal responsibility stands true as
well. The Talmud obligates the courts to interfere in the spiritual welfare of
an individual who refuses to perform Mitzvot.2"6 Furthermore, where
negative prohibitions are concerned, even individual citizens may interfere
in order to prevent a transgression on the part of another person.287
The infringement on the rights of the individual in all of these cases
is not grounded in the power of others to limit the individual's rights, but in
the responsibilities of the individual to the surrounding community and to
him or herself. In the case of medical concerns or restoring the potential
financial loss, it is grounded in the responsibility of others to care for her
friend's needs. In effect, the independence of the mentally disabled person
is maintained along the same standards as the independent rights of any other
member of Jewish society. No person has the right to intervene in the
decisions of another person regardless of the technical intelligence of the
individual. On the contrary, the status of the mentally handicapped person
as a member of the society is maintained in the sense that the selfsame
categories that are applied to any Jew are applied to him or her as well.
These categories have fairly objective criteria as well and will not necessarily
involve the subjective decision making of the intervening party (we will
284. See infra, notes 319-320 and accompanying text.
285. See Mor U'Ketzia 328.
286. See Ketubot 86a-b.
287. See Bava Kamma 28a; Rashi & Yam Shel Shlomo ad loc.: Rambam Hilkhot Avadim
3:5. As to the right of individual citizens to involve themselves with others who refuse to




discuss daily care and decision making below). It is to be assumed that the
need for such intervention might arise more regularly regarding the mentally
handicapped individual and, as such, the responsibilities might be practically
expanded. However, nothing suggesting a type of transfer of decision-
making rights to the state exists in the Halachic system.
F. Best Interest Test
In providing for the welfare of children in custody situations, Halacha
has clearly opted for such a best interest test to determine the best home for
the child. Rashba clearly states that in circumstances where the residence of
the child is in dispute, that which is in the best interest of the child
prevails.288 In the case of a mentally disabled adult, in line with the desire to
maintain the independence of the individual unless he is in violation of one
of the above-mentioned categories, decisions need be made in accordance
with what is in the best interests of the adult. No individual or political body
has the power to make these decisions. There is, however, a need to establish
a system to define who has the capacity to assess and determine the best
interests of the mentally disabled individual.
G. Relatives and Guardians
Nurture, care, and education are best provided by parents when
possible, so long as there is no proof that it is detrimental to the person to
remain with her parents. Both mother and father are assumed to provide
complementary elements of the person's needs for a stable and nurturing
environment.289 In the absence of parents, however, do relatives maintain
any prior status to others as guardians of the mentally handicapped person?
Comparing our situation once again to the circumstance of child
custody disputes, we find some tension as to whether a relative has a
presumptive right to guardianship. The Talmud expresses reservation with
appointing relatives as guardians for concerns of financial misappropriations
288. See TeshuvotHaRashba attributed to Ramban, 38; Radbaz quoted in Pitchei T'shuva
E"H 82:7. For a complete survey of custody literature which is beyond the scope of this
chapter, see Eliav Shochatman, ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLES OF CHILD CUSTODY IN JEWISH LAW,
5 SHENATON LEMISHPAT HAIVRI 285 (5738), Ronald Warburg, Child Custody: A
Comparative Analysis, 14 ISRAEL L. REv. 480-503 (1978); Benzion Schereschewsky, Dinei
Mishpakha, 505 n. 2 (1984).
289. See Ketubot 65b, Rashi ad loc.; 102b, Rashi ad loc. s.v. zot omeret; Rosh ad loc. &
Responsa 82:2.
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based on competing inheritance claims and the like.29° On the other hand,
Chelkat Mekhokek seems to assume a natural right of a grandmother to
assume custody of the grandchild barring any other difficulties.29' It is, in
fact, precisely in such a circumstance that the Rashba declared his best
interest principle and it is codified as such in Shulchan Aruch.29 2 According
to R. Yosef Karo, it is the responsibility of the court to appoint the most
fitting guardian for the child regardless of relationship. If the two candidates
are equal, then the relative has priority. Extending the existing debate
regarding child custody, we find that the application is appropriate for the
mentally disabled person as well. Guardianship would be established using
the best interest principle as well.293
H. Substitution
Does the presumed will of the mentally ill individual impact on the
decision-making process according to Halacha? Should the court or guardian
ask, "what would the subject have wanted" in a circumstance where the
individual himself is unable to express his desire? The Talmud294 describes
a case where a father passes away, leaving sons and a daughter. The sons are
living on their own with the inheritance money. The daughter is relying on
sustenance from her brothers but would benefit from living with her mother
for the nurture and stability that would provide. The Talmud declares that
the daughter remains with the mother and the brothers must support her
nonetheless, albeit from a distance. Rashi 295 comments that the Talmud
290. See Bava Metzia 39a, Rashi ad loc. s.v. velo karov, Shulkhan Arukh Choshen
Mishpat 285:6-8.
291. See Even Ha "ezer 82:7; Chelkat Mechokek 82:11.
292. Choshen Mishpat 290:2 quoting Rashba, Mordechai & Maharam Padua. See Dinei
Mishpacha 543 n. 19.
293. See Farbshtein, Mishptei Da 'at at 193, where he suggests that relatives maintain
primary status based on Rosh in Bava Kamma 3:13. Rosh assumes that relatives may protect
each other from physical harm at the hands of an attacker based on the principle of "avid inish
dina l'nafshei," taking the law into one's own hands. However, Rosh understands that the
right of an unrelated bystander to intervene to protect one from harm is grounded in a
different principle of"Afrushei me'issura," the spiritual welfare of the attacker. In an attempt
to explain the need for two different sources for the two circumstances, R. Farbshtein
suggests that relatives have primary status in the care of family members through assumed
agency. This interpretation of the Rosh is not necessarily what the Rosh had in mind. See
Yam Shel Shlomo 3:27 for a more plausible interpretation grounded in instinctive protective
reactions of relatives during instances of danger.
294. Ketubot 102b.
295. S.v. zot omeret.
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states that the brothers cannot force her to live with them. The implication
is that if she should choose to live with the brothers, it is acceptable. Indeed,
Beit Shmue 296 posits, based on Rashi, that a child's wishes are adhered to
where possible, even if contrary to the regularly prescribed option.
Oftentimes, the preference of the child might be at odds with the best
interests of the child as determined by the adults with the broader vision and
experience to analyze such questions. Under such circumstances, the best
interests of the child will take precedence, following the great principle of
Rashba.2 97
In the situation of a mentally disabled individual who is unable to
express a personal preference, the court or guardian should establish its
decision based on the best interest principle. The principle of substitution
does not play a primary role. In sum, Halacha views the individual as
Tzelem Elokim and, as such, the right of outside intervention is limited to
generally objectively defined best interest criteria.
I. Capacity to Consent
In Halacha, the capacity to consent is referred to as da 'at. We will
presently define da'at, evaluate when a person is deemed to have such
capacity, and clarify whether a mentally disabled individual has decision-
making ability and, if he does, to what degree. These issues relate to the
obligation to fulfill mitzvot, make independent financial decisions, marry and
divorce, as well as consent to medical treatment or sexual acts.
In defining da 'at, the general assumption is that the status of is in
direct contrast with the notion of da'at. Following this line of thinking,
Rashi comments on the Talmud's question, "Who is a shoteh?": "To be
absolved from obligation in mitzvot and punishment, whose purchase is no
purchase and sale, no sale." '298 Once the individual has been deemed a
shoteh, he is defined as incapable of any form of responsible decision-
making. However, there is a strong trend towards compartmentalizing this
status to particular elements and circumstances.
We mentioned above that, following the opinion ofR. Yochanan, one
who lacks capacity in one category is defined as shoteh in all categories.
Tosfot suggests this is true based upon an assumption that once we cannot
guarantee the understanding of the individual, we should question his ability
296. Even Ha 'Ezer 82:9.
297. See Schereschewsky, supra note 288 at 515.
298. Hagiga 3b.
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to decide in all cases. According to Tosfot, if a responsible authority would
evaluate the individual and conclude that he comprehends in some cases, the
individual could be deemed incapable of decision-making in one scenario
and able in another. Thus, our Messiah might have severe borderline issues,
yet be capable of taking care of his own finances, marrying and divorcing,
and other such issues.299
Rambam seemingly rejects the compartmentalization of the shoteh.
In Hilkhot Eidut, Rambam states that once the status ofshoteh is in place, the
individual maintains that status in all circumstances. Yet the interpretation
of Rambam remains unclear. The difficulty in interpreting Rambam derives
from two questions in Rambam's formulation: 1) Why did the Rambam
choose to define the shoteh in Hilkhot Eidut, towards the end of Mishneh
Torah, when he had numerous other possibilities earlier in his work to do so?
and 2) Why did the Rambam base the individual's inability to testify on his
being absolved from commandments when, logically, both ofthese issues are
grounded in a third issue, namely the individual's lack of competence?"°0
These questions point to Rambam's attempt to compartmentalize the
issues. For Rambam, the example of testimony possesses unique
characteristics. Since testimony impacts on others and demands full
understanding of a given situation in order to incriminate others, one cannot
compartmentalize the issues. As such, once the individual is seen to lack
capacity in one instance, he is not reliable for testimony in court. Precisely
for this reason, such an individual is not obligated in Mitzvot. The obligation
to fulfill commandments may not be compartmentalized-either the
responsibility is appropriate for the individual or not. This reasoning is not
due to the individual's general lack of capacity, but rather to the particularly
all-encompassing requirements of these two issues of mitzvot and testimony.
Therefore, the Rambam links the reasons for these cases to each other and
chooses the Laws of Testimony as the place to define the category. However,
in all other matters, such as financial, medical, or spousal decisions, the
individual should be evaluated in a case by case manner.30 1
Following this model, both Rambam and Tosfot agree that despite the
fact that one is declared incompetent in Halacha, he does not forfeit da 'at, or
the ability to make decisions entirely. The incompetent individual still
maintains independence in the particular areas where it is warranted. In
other words, despite the fact that the notion of is in direct conflict with
299. Ig'ME:H 120 interprets Tosfot in this manner.
300. See Kesef Mishnah, Eidut ad loc., Ig"M loc. cit.
301. See Noda Bi'Yehuda, Or HaYashar #30, Ig "M loc. cit. (based on Maharit E"H, 16;
R. Yosef Steinhart, Or HaYashar no. 11.
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having da 'at, these opinions maintain that the individual can, in part, be
considered competent and, in part, incompetent.
J. Definitions of Da 'at
Our discussion until this point has assumed a particular model of
da'at, i.e., having the capacity to decide. In fact there are two distinct
models of understanding what elements must be present in order to be
capable of responsible decision-making. Does da 'at demand the ability to
be aware of and understand one's actions, or is one required to understand
the consequences of one's actions as well? For example, if a seemingly
incompetent individual stands on the corner and hands out five dollar bills to
every person that passes him by, is that transaction binding? To resolve the
issue, we would need to determine if the individual had the capacity to
perform such a transaction. If we asked the person what he was doing, he
could describe precisely that he was giving five dollars to every passer-by in
an attempt to be a friendly neighbor. Clearly, in a short while, the individual
would wipe out his bank account. Has the individual performed the
transaction with da'at or not? He is aware of the action, but does not
understand the consequences of his actions.
Rabbi Yehezkel Landau maintained that understanding of the
particular action was all that was necessary for the transaction to be valid.3"2
As such, the above transaction would be valid. R. Landau suggested this
interpretation in responding to the Rabbis of Frankfort in the famed "get" of
Cleves. 30 3 In that case, the husband appeared to be lucid regarding most
matters with the exception of his apparently irrational concern that people
were about to take his life. The husband divorced his wife days after they
had married each other. Many were concerned that he had not been
competent to grant the divorce at the time of its execution. 0 4 Although R.
Landau believed that the husband was lucid, he argued that even if he was
considered a shoteh, the "get"would be valid because he was fully aware of
his actions. This would be the case regardless of whether he was in a
position to understand the long-term consequences of his actions. This
opinion would allow for significantly more decision-making on the part of
302. See Or HaYashar, Responsa 30.
303. R. Landau bases his interpretation onMGittin 22b. Tosfots.v. veha implies that when
explanation is available to the shoteh, we may assume that he appropriately fulfills the
obligation, barring others issues. He also relies heavily on Yerushalmi, Terumot 1:1.
304. See the letter of the Rabbis of Frankfort in Or HaYashar.
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many mentally disabled individuals. However, the Noda BiY'huda's opinion
did not gain widespread acceptance.
K. Practical Applications
1. Medical Cases
Our discussion of transferring decision-making powers is grounded
in the need for consent and autonomy, and the lack thereof regarding an
individual who is mentally disabled. From the Halachic vantage point, we
need to assess to what degree autonomous decisions are indeed central to the
performance of medical procedures. In routine cases, Halacha does not
recognize the need for consent." 5 As such, where a doctor deems it
necessary to perform a routine procedure to guarantee the health of the
individual, it is done as per the obligation of the doctor to heal and the
individual to take care of herself. Recent literature, however, has reflected
at least a degree of autonomy in the area of medical treatment, which
demands the consent of the patient and raises the question of how to decide
whether to perform a particular procedure or not. R. Ya'akov Emden
understood coercion as appropriate only in the circumstance of a refuah
beduka, where the benefits of said procedure were beyond doubt. However,
where the risk/benefit ratios significantly changed, the individual has the
right to forego the treatment.30 6 Experimental treatment, dangerous or life-
threatening procedures, and treatment that could result in trauma30 7 cannot
be declared as obligatory forms of medical care. Under such circumstances,
consent is necessary before the doctor proceeds.30 8 As discussed above, such
decisions are assessed using best-interest principles with no need to resort to
any transfer of power.
305. See Responsa Radbaz 3:485; 4:1139 (regarding the piety of the Tosafist R. Yitzhak
ben Asher (Riva)). See also Magen Avraham O.H. 328:6. For a survey of the literature on
this topic, see D. Sinclair, The Status of Medical Treatment Against the Will of the Patient,
18-19 SHENATON HAMISHPAT HAIVRI, 265-294 (Hebrew) (1992-94).
306. See Mor U'Ketzia 328.
307. See Sinclair, supra note 308 at 289.
308. For further discussion on the risk/benefit categories, see Iggerot Moshe, YD. 2:58




The nature of consent in sexual matters as required by Halacha is
subject to dispute. The Talmud states that a married woman who willfully
commits adultery is prohibited from remaining with her husband.309 If,
however, the adulterous act was coerced, the woman is permitted to remain
with her husband as her act is not rendered a technically adulterous act. The
Talmud explores the nature of the required consent by using a consenting
minor as an example. The Talmud states that a married minor that is seduced
and consents to sex with another is permitted to remain with her husband.3"
Clearly, the nature of her consent is somewhat lacking and, thus, cannot
generate the necessary rebellious status. The point is subject to debate. The
Jerusalem Talmud seems to understand the matter differently. In that text,
it appears that the consent of the minor is adequate and she may not remain
with her husband. 1' Although the dispute has been explained in different
ways,312 one possible interpretation responds directly to our issue. The
woman in question clearly understood the circumstances and was not
physically coerced into committing this act. In one sense, she most certainly
did agree to an illicit sexual act. The concern, however, is that despite the
fact that she understood the act and agreed to it, it is certainly questionable
as to whether she understood the consequences of her action. This case goes
to the heart of the nature of consent in Halacha. The Bavli demands an
understanding of the consequences of the act as well as of the act itself. The
minor is not capable of that and is thus permitted to return to her husband.
The Yerushalmi accepts the lucid decision on the part of the minor as
acceptable consent in this regard.3" 3
Later sources reflect precisely the same debate regarding a mentally
disabled woman who consents to having sex with a man. If the woman is
shown to have been lucid enough to have understood the nature of the act,
does her consent allow the gentleman to engage in sexual activity or should
a court doubt the validity of such consent? Chochmat Adam allows a
mentally disabled married woman who is involved in an adulterous
relationship to remain with her husband on the grounds that her consent is
309. See Ketubot, supra note 86.
310. See Yevamot 33b, 61b; Rabad Hil. Sotah 2:4.
311. See Talmud Yerushalmi, Rambam Hil. Sotah 2:4; Yeshuot ya 'akov E:H 121:4.
312. See e.g. Responsa Hatam Sofer E:H 2:4.
313. See Yeshuot Ya'akov supra note 313. This interpretation directly parallels that of
Noda BiY'huda supra notes 304-307. These two authorities describe the two Talmuds as
disagreeing on the fundamental issue of the nature of consent in Halakha.
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not reflective of willful action. Since she does not truly understand the
consequences of her action, her consent does not reflect da'at. In the
discussion, the Chochmat Adam rejects an alternate proposition. M'kom
Shmuel had argued that a such consent would most certainly prohibit the
woman from returning to her husband on the grounds that so long as she was
aware of her decision and performed the action willfully, her consent is
valid.3 14 As most Halachic authorities demand an understanding of the
consequences of the action as well, the woman's consent under such
circumstances is not considered valid.
3. Adoption
As discussed above, parents do not maintain any type of ownership
rights over their children in the Halachic system. As such, the concept of
adoption requires clarification within this Halachic system. Children of
Jewish families may be given for adoption in two possible ways. First,
parents who are responsible for providing for their children might feel
themselves incapable of doing so and, therefore, search for a more secure
home for their children. Under these circumstances, the parents are
essentially signing an agreement to allow others to raise their children in
accordance with all of the elements stipulated in the agreement. Second, a
court can establish that the home of the parents is no longer a safe and viable
environment for the child and, for reasons of security, the court will decide
to find a more appropriate home for the child.
In discussing the adoption of the child of a mentally disabled
individual, we return to our previously elucidated categories. Cases of the
first type require consent as would any transaction. Most authorities would
render the shoteh incapable of making such decisions without an
understanding of the long term consequences of the act. It should be noted,
however, that some ofthe nuanced definitions of shoteh (i.e., 1'davar echad)
might allow for a compartmentalization of issues, thus allowing a Halachic
shoteh to perform such a transaction.
Regarding cases of the second type, we have clarified above that
categories such as substitution and parens patriae do not play a role in
Halachic decisions. The best interest rule will ultimately settle the issue-in
this case, the best interests of the child serving as the deciding factor.
314. See Binat Adam, Sha 'ar Bet HaNashim, 35. On the acceptability of the comparison
between a minor and a mentally disabled individual, see Pitchei Teshuvah E "H 68:6 and R.
Akiva Eger E"H 178:3.
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L. Conclusion
As we have demonstrated, there is much evidence in Halachic law
that issues concerning consent and the mentally disabled are analyzed
similarly to issues concerning children. Obviously, children are capable of
forming informed decisions about certain circumstances in their lives while
they may lack the capacity in others. Likewise, Jewish law is prepared to
evaluate various decisions made by the mentally impaired on a case-by-case
basis, rather than categorizing the person as generally incompetent.
While Halachic and American law diverge in providing rationales for
when and why a surrogate needs to substitute judgment regarding consent on
behalf of a mentally disabled person, it is clear that a basic tenet in Jewish
law-as well as a driving force in American law and policy-is the
protection of the mentally disabled and the desire to act in the person's best
interest.

